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GOVERNING FINTECH 4.0: BIGTECH,
PLATFORM FINANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE
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Sergeev,**** and Dirk Zetzsche*****
ABSTRACT:
Over the past 150 years, finance has evolved into one of the world’s
most globalized, digitized, and regulated industries. Digitalization
has transformed finance, but also enabled new entrants over the past
decade in the form of technology companies, especially FinTechs
and BigTechs. As a highly digitalized industry, incumbents and new
entrants alike are increasingly pursuing similar approaches and
models, focusing on the economies of scope and scale typical of
finance and the network effects typical of data. Predictably, this has
resulted in the emergence of large digital finance platforms. We
argue that the combination of digitalization, new entrants (especially
BigTechs), and the evolution of dominant digital finance
platforms—which we describe as FinTech 4.0 and mark as
beginning in 2019-2020—brings both massive benefits and an
increasing range of risks to growth and broader sustainable
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development. The emergence of concentration and dominance in
digital finance poses challenges for societies and regulators around
the world that, thus far, are most clearly evident in the United States
and China. Existing regulatory frameworks for finance, competition,
data, and technology are not designed to comprehensively address
the challenges these trends pose. Instead, we need to build new
approaches, domestically and internationally, to maximize the
benefits of network effects and economies of scope and scale in
digital finance. At the same time, we need to monitor and control the
attendant risks of concentration and dominance in digital finance
across existing regulatory silos. We argue for a principles-based
approach that brings together regulators responsible for different
sectors and functions, both overseeing on a functional activitiesbased approach but also – as scale and interconnectedness increase –
addressing specific entities as they emerge. This graduated
proportional hybrid approach is appropriate both domestically in the
United States, China, and elsewhere, as well as for cross-border
groups, building on the experiences of supervisory colleges and
supervision developed for Globally Systemically Important Financial
Institutions (G-SIFIs) and Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs).
This will need to be combined with an appropriate strategic approach
to data in finance, to enable the maximization of the benefits of data
aggregation while constraining related risks of concentration and
dominance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past 20 years, new technology and data giants have
evolved. These giants–“BigTechs,” especially Meta (formerly
Facebook), Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Amazon (“MAGMA”) in the
United States and Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (“BATs”) in China–now
permeate all aspects of society and the economy in their respective
countries and, increasingly, globally. BigTechs have developed from the
combination of technological evolution (digitization, datafication,
digitalization), conducive regulatory approaches, in the United States
and China in particular (at least prior to 2019-2020), and the network
effects that characterize data industries. While the resulting
concentration and dominance have long been a source of concern in the
European Union, they have now also emerged as major social, political,
regulatory, and legal foci in the United States and China, with both
countries trying to balance the benefits of these dominant platforms for
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consumers against concerns about abuses of data and market position. 1
The COVID-19 pandemic fostered increased digitization across 2020
and 2021, amplifying and reinforcing these pre-existing trends.
Subsequently, the governance of BigTech and the role of data are
emerging as major issues for the 21st century and lie at the heart of
balancing the benefits and risks of the “digitization of everything” in the
Fourth Industrial Revolution.2
The focus of this Article is the intersection of these trends with
finance. Over the past 150 years, finance has evolved into one of the
most globalized, digitalized, and regulated industries. Importantly, in the
last decade, BigTech has likewise expanded into the financial sector.3 In
finance, BigTech joins a range of existing large and dominant players
(“Big Finance”),4 as well as a gamut of other new entrants (FinTechs
and TechFins)5 seeking to scale and evolve into Big FinTechs.6 All of
1.

See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE

SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT
8 (2019).
2. See Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What it Means, How to
Respond, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/
2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/
[https://perma.cc/D6CN-V6GN].
3. See Agustín Carstens et al., Regulating Big Techs in Finance, BIS (Aug. 2,
2021), https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull45.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XRK-4224]; Juan
Carlos Crisanto et al., Big Techs in Finance: Regulatory Approaches and Policy
Options, BIS (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsibriefs12.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RC5H-6YQR].
4. See Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Digital Finance Platforms: Toward a New
Regulatory Paradigm, 23 UNIV. PA. J. BUS. & L. 273, 275-76 (2020).
5. See Douglas W. Arner et al., The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis
Paradigm?, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1271, 1273 (2016); Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., From
FinTech to TechFin: The Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance, 14 N.Y.U.
J.L. & BUS. 393, 393, 400 (2018); Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Regulating a Revolution:
From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31,
31, 34 (2017).
6. Katherine Foster et al., BigFintechs and Their Impacts on Sustainable
Development, UNDP (2021), https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/202106/UNDP-UNCDF-TP-1-1-BigFintechs-and-Their-Impacts-on-SustainableDevelopment-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/RLQ6-XT9U]; Katherine Foster et al.,
BigFintechs and Their Impacts on Macroeconomic Policies, UNDP (2021),
https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2021-06/UNDP-UNCDF-TP-1-1BBigFintechs-and-Their-Impacts-on-Macroeconomic-Policies-EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G9DW-UAZE]; Artem Sergeev et al., Policymakers, BigFintechs and
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, UNDP (2021),
https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2021-06/UNDP-UNCDF-TP-3-1OF
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these entities are focused on leveraging network effects and economies
of scope and scale to maximize their market share, data pools, income,
and profitability. These trends express themselves in the platformization
of finance and in the evolution of large digital finance platforms that
combine technology and finance.
Finance has long been characterized by a tendency towards scale
and concentration. This was reflected in the 2008 Global Financial
Crisis (“GFC”) and the resulting regulatory frameworks developed for
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and reckoning with
“too-big-to-fail,” “too-complex-to-govern,” and “too-big-to-jail” banks.7
The emergence of digital finance platforms over the past 20 years
reflects fundamental changes in economies and societies across the
world.8 Digitization and datafication offer tremendous potential for
network effects and economies of scope and scale, and have duly
emerged in the platform economy and more recently in the
platformization of finance. We identify this new stage of evolution as
FinTech 4.09-a new era of dominant digital finance platforms.
Policymakers-BigFintechs-and-the-United-Nations-SDGs-EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/83Y3-XL7B]; Kuzi Charamba et al., BigFintechs and International
Governance, Policymaking and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals:
the SDGs in the International Governance of Finance, UNDP (2021),
https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2021-06/UNDP-UNCDF-TP-3-1Policymakers-BigFintechs-and-the-United-Nations-SDGs-EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EN4R-KXSC].
7. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and
Corporate Responsibility, 102 MINN. L. REV. 761, 763 (2017); Howell E. Jackson,
Introduction: Thinking Hard About Systemic Risk, in SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE FINANCIAL
SECTOR: TEN YEARS AFTER THE GREAT CRASH 1, 2 (Douglas W. Arner et al. eds.,
2019); ROSS P. BUCKLEY & DOUGLAS W. ARNER, From Crisis to Crisis: The Global
Financial System and Regulatory Failure, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE
LAW SERIES 1, 14-15 (Joseph J. Norton et al. eds., 2011).
8. In this paper we will refer to FinTechs, TechFins, and BigTechs that operate in
finance as “digital finance platforms” collectively.
9. This concept builds on typologies developed and discussed in a previous paper.
See Arner et al., supra note 5. FinTech 1.0 was about building the technology to support
the financial system. The groundwork for much of the developments that we see today
began in 1867 with the laying of the first trans-Atlantic telegraph cable. This allowed
for communication between London and New York, and further expansion of the lines
connected other capitals. FinTech 2.0 took off in 1967. It was marked by the
introduction of the ATM and the launch of the first handheld calculator by Texas
Instruments. The global financial crisis marked the beginning of FinTech 3.0—the era
in which Fintech start-ups emerged from the crisis to address inadequacies and
shortcomings of legacy banking institutions; to leverage the introduction of the iPhone;
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The emergence of FinTech 4.0 is marked by two significant events.
The first was the announcement of Libra (now called Diem) by a Metaled consortium, a clear example of a BigTech seeking to build an
extraordinary digital finance platform.10 The second was the halting of
the planned initial public offering (IPO) of Ant in 2020 due to
regulators’ concerns about its model of platformization and related risks
concentration and dominance.11
These major trends present tremendous opportunities for
sustainable development–particularly in emerging markets and
developing countries–through new business models that provide access
to novel sources of finance and greater financial inclusion. Most
recently, governments have begun to consider the roles they can play in
the context of platformization of finance, with central bank digital
currencies (CBDCs) being an example of how governments can join
tech and finance firms in seeking to leverage the benefits of digital
finance platforms.12 Thus, the question is how these new innovations
should be governed to maximize positive returns while minimizing risk
and negative impacts.
The governance of FinTech 4.0’s digital finance platforms–
regardless of their genesis–and their impacts require granular, nuanced,
and targeted policies and regulations. Platform-based models of finance
require regulation across multiple fields, including data protection,
competition and antitrust, telecommunications, and finance in ways that
do not easily allow for coherence in regulatory approach and scope, both
nationally and internationally. The antecedent step, however, requires
appreciation of the broader system and actors that can contribute
towards the development of such policy and regulation. Our current era,
FinTech 4.0, is characterized by the expanding dominance of a small
number of increasingly pervasive digital finance platforms operating
and to respond to the extensive new financial regulation. FinTech 3.0 was also marked
by the launching of the iPhone and M-Pesa in 2007; the Global Financial Crisis in
2008; and Bitcoin and blockchain in 2009.
10. See Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Regulating Libra, 41 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 80, 81
(2021).
11. For a robust discussion on reasons for Ant’s IPO crackdown, see Angela
Huyue Zhang, Agility Over Stability: China’s Great Reversal in Regulating the
Platform Economy, 63 HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2022), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3892642 [https://perma.cc/SK7M-S5SQ].
12. See Ross P. Buckley et al., Sovereign Digital Currencies: Reshaping the Future
of Payments and Money, 15 J. PAYMENT STRATEGY & SYS. 7, 9 (2021).
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across borders with network effects and economies of scope and scale.
Concerted collaboration across public and private sectors will be critical
for producing cohesive regulatory policies and practices for this new
era.13 Consequently, we argue for a principles-based approach towards
the governance of digital finance platforms and their impacts, built
around core regulatory objectives across finance, antitrust and
competition, data, security, innovation, and broad sustainable
development. Pivotal to achieving these wide-ranging objectives are
coordination among regulators, domestically and internationally, and the
implementation of a proportional, graduated, and risk-based hybrid
regulatory approach, crossing both activities and entity regulation,
which seeks to encourage innovation while addressing risks. This must
be joined with a strategic approach to digital infrastructure and data use
within each economy to minimize risks of concentration and dominance
while maximizing the positive contribution to sustainable development.
The Article is in six parts. Part II provides an overview of the rise
of digital finance platforms in the context of the evolution of FinTech
4.0. In doing so, we discuss the major drivers that have led to the current
state of affairs as well as corollary risks and opportunities. Part III takes
a step back from the developments discussed in Part II and presents the
various regulatory fields and issues involved in addressing the
platformization of finance at various levels of governance and
regulatory competence. Within this context, we analyze the complexity
of the governance challenges facing regulators and policymakers,
highlighting that concentration and dominance in digital finance extends
across multiple regulatory areas. Part IV explores the key principles
necessary for the governance of digital finance platforms, focusing on
how these affect sustainable development, seeking to maximize positive
impact while minimizing negative outcomes. Part V considers the tools
and range of regulatory approaches available to regulators and
policymakers seeking to effect change within various scenarios. We
argue that the central approach is based on proportionality, with
regulation graduated to support new entrants, technologies, and business
models but calibrated to steadily increase as participants move from
“too-small-to-care” to “too-large-to-ignore” to “too-big-to-fail.” Part VI
concludes by highlighting the necessity of cooperation for effective
governance and the various organizational approaches available to
international regulators and policymakers. Part VI also explores how to

13.

See Carstens et al., supra note 3.
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better deploy the existing institutional structures and the potential of
new structures, such as a global Digital Stability Board.14
II. FINTECH 4.0: TOWARDS A NEW DIGITAL “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” IN
FINANCE
FinTech 4.0 is marked primarily by the emergence of scale in the
context of platformization of finance, both from the disruptive entry of
BigTech firms as well as in the context of Big Finance incumbents and
the scaling of FinTechs and TechFins.15 The central point is that
digitization and datafication of finance over a period of decades,
combined with network effects and economies of scope and scale, are
resulting in an ever-greater concentration and dominance not only in
technology but also in finance: the emergence of a new “too-big-to-fail”
and possibly even “too-big-to-regulate”.
BigTechs, which include Meta, Google, Amazon, Tencent, and
Alibaba, to name a few, represent a broader group of firms in which
technology has come to dramatically drive their growth, scale,
diversification, and dominance. Their entrance into finance is significant
because of the scale at which they operate and the means through which
they can engage with large numbers of people, including unbanked,
underbanked, and otherwise financially excluded persons.16 In credit
markets, for example, it is estimated these firms lent nearly $600 billion
globally in 2019 and were important lenders in China, the United States,
and an increasing number of emerging markets.17 This is all the more
staggering because BigTechs are not traditional financial institutions.
Rather, they are large companies whose primary activities encompass a

14. The case for a Digital Stability Board is very well made in Robert Fay, Digital
Platforms Require a Global Governance Framework, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE
INNOVATION (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.cigionline.org/articles/digital-platformsrequire-global-governance-framework/ [https://perma.cc/4MQN-4A6F].
15. See Erik Feyen et al., FinTech and the Digital Transformation of Financial
Services: Implications for Market Structure and Public Policy, BIS (July 13, 2021),
https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap117.htm [https://perma.cc/MH8A-E5PB].
16. See BigTech Firms in Finance in Emerging Market and Developing
Economies, FSB (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P1210201.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QN6-RYTM] [hereinafter BigTech Firms in Finance].
17. Giulio Cornelli et al., FinTech and Big Tech Credit: A New Database 1-2,
(BIS, Working Paper No. 887, 2020), https://www.bis.org/publ/work887.htm
[https://perma.cc/MPC3-P5FC].
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broader set of more general digital services, including online search
engines,
social
media,
e-commerce,
ride-hailing,
and
18
telecommunications. Data is their primary currency, and few suspected
that these platform-based models would be the medium through which
these entities could also become financial intermediaries, offering a
growing range of digital financial services.19 This generally starts with
payment, then moves to credit and investment, and from there to an
ever-wider range of areas.20 Indeed, by leveraging their large customer
bases, troves of data from those customers, and sophisticated technology
applications (such as artificial intelligence and cloud computing),
BigTechs have been able to provide payments, credit, insurance, and
digital wallets in ways that traditional financial institutions have failed
to do.21 This trend has been driven by several factors.
First, BigTechs enjoy increasing numbers of users on their
platforms as more people around the world gain smartphone and internet
access. With user-friendly application programming interfaces (APIs),
firms are able to offer a series of services through a platform-based
model that connects users across a vast global network.22 The
connections vary depending on the type of digital platform. From social
media apps to e-commerce websites, there are a variety of platforms that
bring together buyers and sellers across a range of industries and
enterprises.23 The use of these platforms has increased significantly
during the COVID-19 pandemic, as governments mandated lockdowns
and forced people indoors to control the spread of the virus.24 This

18. FIN. STABILITY BOARD, BIGTECH IN FINANCE: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND
POTENTIAL FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS 16 (2019).
19. Id.
20. Id. See also Jon Frost et al., BigTech and the Changing Structure of Financial
Intermediation 62 (BIS, Working Papers No. 779, 2019), https://www.bis.org/
publ/work779.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEW9-PYRH].
21. Id.
22. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIG TECH IN FINANCE: OPPORTUNITIES AND
RISKS 62 (2019), https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2019e3.htm [https://perma.cc/
7HVN-TFK5].
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Financial Times Editorial Board, The Big Tech Boom Marks a
Lasting Change, FIN. TIMES (July 31, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/36fd57a052bb-4bed-b9a9-46dfb69b2f52 [https://perma.cc/497Y-HLJZ]; Laura LaBerge et al.,
How COVID-19 Has Pushed Companies Over the Technology Tipping Point—And
Transformed Business Forever, MCKINSEY & CO. (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.
mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/how-
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increase fueled the success of the BigTech business model, which is
itself founded upon the “DNA model.”25
The DNA model, which is the second factor driving BigTech’s
entry into finance, refers to the reinforcing cycle of data analytics,
network effects, and interwoven activities.26 As users realize that a
platform offers a valuable product or service, over time they are likely to
encourage or attract other users onto the platform.27 For example, sellers
on an e-commerce site may realize that the platform provides an easy to
use and secure site to sell merchandise to buyers in a global
marketplace. This ease of business is likely, in turn, to attract more
sellers onto the site. As the number of sellers or merchants increase,
there is a concomitant increase in the number of buyers on the site,
attracted by the diversity of merchants and the competitive prices
available from the growing pool of vendors. As this network of buyers
and sellers increases, the platform begins to generate “network effects,”
which arise whenever greater numbers of users participating on a
platform render it more useful to all users.28 Rising numbers of
participants in turn generate new troves of data for the platform.29 The
data is a key input into the platforms’ algorithms and data analytics, and
allows them to create better products and services that are tailored more
specifically to their users and consumers.30 As the products and services
become better, they attract more users and enable the platform to create
new services and products for those users–which we term “interwoven
activities.”31 This cycle can lead to a platform’s rapid growth and
dominance within a particular sector and helps to explain how BigTechs
came to dominate their respective categories in such relatively short
periods of time.32 It also accounts for how BigTechs have been able to
move into financial services. As they attract more users onto their
platforms and analyze the increasing data from their activities, BigTechs
are able to create and offer complementary services, such as payments,
covid-19-has-pushed-companies-over-the-technology-tipping-point-and-transformedbusiness-forever [https://perma.cc/QRE3-PJAY].
25. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 22.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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in order to better facilitate interactions and transactions across the
network, which is particularly valuable in the context of e-commerce
and gaming, as well as enabling monetization of social media.33 Ant’s
Alipay and Tencent’s TenPay are two prominent examples from China,
emerging from e-commerce and social media enterprises respectively.34
Another notable example is Meta’s more daring proposal of a global
stablecoin for its platform, first introduced as Libra and now known as
Diem, enabled via WhatsApp/Facebook/Instagram Pay, Novi digital
wallets, and related identification frameworks.35 BigTech firms are
expanding further into other areas of economic interest for users, such as
credit, insurance, and money market funds by playing a matchmaking or
intermediary role for consumers and various financial product vendors
or by providing loans or investments directly, enabled by automated
analytics supported by their massive pools of data.36
The third enabling driver for BigTechs’ expansion into financial
services is the application of relatively new technology and tools that
have matured significantly in recent years. These technologies consist
primarily of artificial intelligence, big data, cloud computing, and
distributed ledger technologies, often shortened to “ABCD.”37 For
example, using a combination of these technologies, BigTechs can
extend credit to individuals in ways beyond traditional financial
institutions.38 Traditional financial institutions typically determine
whether to make a loan on the basis of collateral, earning potential, or
business plans.39 BigTechs, on the other hand, are able to use alternative
and unconventional data sources amassed in large quantities from
activities on their platforms and other accessible sources (Big Data), and
then process this data using advanced analytical methods such as
machine learning and network analysis (artificial intelligence).40 The
Big Data used can include any combination of: (i) transactions (sales
volumes and average selling prices); (ii) reputation-related information
(claim ratio, handling time, reviews, and complaints); and (iii) industryspecific characteristics (sales seasonality, demand trends, and
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 18, at 11.
Frost et al., supra note 20.
Zetzsche et al., supra note 10.
Frost et al., supra note 20.
See Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Decentralized Finance, 6 J. FIN. REGUL. 172, 17982 (2020).
38. Frost et al., supra note 20.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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macroeconomic sensitivity).41 This can be enriched by using nontraditional data obtained via social media and other channels, in addition
to credit and payment history data.42 These multiple data points, taken
together, can provide a better picture of a borrower’s financial health
and ability to repay a loan, and are applicable to both individuals and
businesses.43 These applications of technology are more efficient and
effective than traditional methods.44 It is efficient as BigTechs can make
quicker and more accurate determinations of credit allocation than
traditional banks, and it is more effective because they are able to reach
and service the large numbers of unbanked and underbanked people and
businesses (particularly micro- and small-and-medium-size enterprises,
or “MSMEs”) typically neglected by traditional banks.45 These
efficiencies can be further enhanced by cost savings using cloud
computing and data servers which can reduce or remove the need for
traditional brick-and-mortar branches and staff who meet individual
customers in person. Rather, BigTechs simply invite individuals and
institutions to log on to their platforms and interact with user-friendly
APIs from the comfort of their smartphones or computers.
The entrance of BigTechs into financial services has been a boon
for universal financial inclusion, particularly in emerging market and
developing economies (“EMDEs”).46 By acting as intermediaries,
BigTech platforms have opened the door to digital payments, savings
and investment opportunities, and alternative sources of finance.47 Some
of these alternative finance models include platform-based lending (as
described above), debt and equity crowdfunding, peer-2-peer (“P2P”)
lending, and invoice-based lending.48 Further, by developing and
deploying sophisticated payment tools and infrastructure, such as the
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 22.
Frost et al., supra note 20.
Id.
Id.
Karen Croxson et al., Platform-based Business Models and Financial
Inclusion, DIGIT. FRONTIERS INST. (Oct. 5, 2021), https://www.dcfintechweek.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/10/Jon-Frost-Karen_Croxson-et-al-Platform-based-businessmodels-and-financial-inclusion-Oct-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/YN4P-5Q98]; Frost et
al., supra note 20; BigTech Firms in Finance, supra note 16.
47. BigTech Firms in Finance, supra note 16.
48. Id.
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Quick Response (QR) code-based systems, which have gained rapid
popularity in several Asian and Latin American countries,49 BigTechs
have contributed to economic growth and development.50
The best examples are in China. In 2004, Alibaba created Alipay, a
payment service, to enable electronic payments that support e-commerce
and spun it off into a separate affiliate (Ant Financial) in 2010.51 By
2020, almost a billion people used Alipay, with similar numbers using
TenPay.52 From payments, Ant expanded into money market funds
(Yu’ebao) in 2013 as an alternative saving and investment tool, and by
2018 Yu’ebao had become the largest of any such fund in the world.53
Ant also branched into platform lending, becoming one of the largest
consumer and MSME lenders in China and one of the largest issuers of
asset-backed securities (to finance these lending operations) by 2018.54
Coming into 2020, Ant had expanded across payments, wealth
management, lending, insurance, credit scoring, and data sales
services.55 Ant’s only major competitor was fellow BigTech Tencent
(which owns the dominant messaging and social network app WeChat),
and the two firms accounted for 94 percent of the payments market.56 As
seen in China, BigTechs are able to generate and command such
significant economies of scope and scale that they existentially threaten
traditional financial institutions.57 At the same time, this dominance
triggered a comprehensive regulatory response across 2020 and 2021
which continues to evolve.
The entrance of any new actor or activity in financial services can
pose risks to financial stability, market integrity, competition, and

49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Lambert Bu et al., The Future of Digital Innovation in China, MCKINSEY &
CO. (Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/china/the-future-ofdigital-innovation-in-china-megatrends-shaping-one-of-the-worlds-fastest-evolvingdigital-ecosystems [https://perma.cc/U5Q7-W4B9]; Aaron Klein, China’s Digital
Payments Revolution, BROOKINGS (Apr. 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/
chinas-digital-payments-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/K8AA-AWWA].
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. BigTech Firms in Finance, supra note 16.
55. Id.
56. See Digital Disruption in Banking and its Impact on Competition, OECD
(2020), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/digital-disruption-in-financial-markets.
htm [https://perma.cc/XD26-6FL9].
57. See BigTech Firms in Finance, supra note 16; Carstens et al., supra note 3.

14

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

consumer protection.58 This is particularly so where the new actors do
not operate primarily within the financial industry.59 As e-commerce,
telecommunication, or social media platforms, the new actors typically
engage a multitude of other regulatory issues, such as data privacy and
cybersecurity.60 This is also the case as incumbents seek to pursue
similar approaches and models on the basis of digitalization of finance.
Moreover, like G-SIFIs but perhaps more so, the sheer size and
global spread of BigTechs pose systemic and cross-border risks that can
be perplexing and daunting for regulators and policymakers.61 For
example, regulators now have to grapple with BigTechs accumulating
vast amounts of data in ways that raise barriers to entry, support
anticompetitive practices, and present novel risks to consumers’ data
privacy and protection.62 These issues arise from the DNA model,
network effects, and economies of scope and scale that all combine to
drive the emergence of concentration and dominance via platformization
of finance.63 Problems also stem from the pursuit of “ecosystem”
models, based on the exclusive acquisition and control of data and its
benefits that seek to lock customers into corporate “walled gardens.”64
This approach is characteristic of MAGMA, BATs, and most tech firms
engaging in financial services.65 Most FinTech start-ups seek to build
ecosystems and platforms with the intention of growing into Big
FinTechs, as occurred with earlier FinTechs such as Bloomberg, Visa,
and PayPal.66 Financial institutions transforming into data platforms
have followed similar paths, such as BlackRock in asset management,67
Ping An in insurance, and Citadel and Robinhood in trading.68 This is
the TechFin model of applying a data-centered approach to finance.69 It

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See Frost et al., supra note 20; BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 22.
See Carstens et al., supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 22.
See Carstens et al., supra note 3. See also Croxson et al., supra note 46.
See, e.g., Qian Tong, China’s Assault on Big Tech’s ‘Walled Gardens’, NIKKEI
ASIA (Sept. 28, 2021), https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/China-s-assault-on-BigTech-s-walled-gardens [https://perma.cc/PR97-NH6H].
65. Id.
66. Croxson et al. supra note 46.
67. See Zetzsche et al., supra note 4, at 275.
68. Id.
69. See Zetzsche et al., supra note 5, at 405.
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is even the approach of DLT platforms such as Ethereum, with
decentralization in time requiring platformization.70
This evolutionary growth results in a cycle of concentration and
dominance. Yet still, according to a recent report by University College
London’s Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, it is likely that we
are underestimating the true extent of this dominance and its resulting
wealth because of how disclosure frameworks are currently designed.71
At present, reporting rules mandated by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission provide Big Tech firms with significant
discretion as to which product financials they disclose and when.72 This
enables them to keep large products, often with dominant user bases,
hidden from investors and potential competitors, limiting the ability of
regulators to police highly profitable digital platforms.73 These large
user bases, typically generated from “free” services, are a critical source
for data aggregation, cross subsidization, and further monetization
strategies.74 For example, Google Chrome and the Android mobile
operating system both contribute significantly towards Google’s user
acquisition and retention, thus driving revenue generation on its other
products including online ads, Google Search, and the Android App
Store.75 Thus, data and technology businesses are often characterized as
“winner-takes-all” or “winner-takes-most” industries in which
oligopolies or even monopolies are a natural result.76 Consequently,
while the platformization of finance as an extension of BigTech
ecosystems can deliver considerable benefits for consumers, the
tendency towards concentration and dominance brings a range of risks
and concerns. These can span from reductions in competition and
innovation, to security (both of personal data and in financial stability
and national security), and eventually to inequality.77 This is the new
“too-big-to-fail.”

70.
71.

See Zetzsche et al., supra note 37, at 179.
ILAN STRAUSS ET AL., CROUCHING TIGER, HIDDEN DRAGONS: HOW 10-K
DISCLOSURE RULES HELP BIGTECH CONCEAL MARKET POWER AND EXPAND PLATFORM
DOMINANCE 1 (2021).
72. Id. at 1.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 6-17.
75. Id. at 15.
76. See generally Joost Rietveld & Melissa Schilling, Platform Competition: A
Systematic and Interdisciplinary Review of the Literature, 47 J. MGMT. 1528 (2021).
77. See Carstens et al., supra note 3.
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It is also potentially the catalyst for the emergence of firms which
are “too-big-to-regulate.” For example, a recent International Monetary
Fund (IMF) study found that firms with significant market power and
cash reserves, such as Apple and Alphabet (parent of Google) with $200
billion and $150 billion of cash reserves respectively and market
capitalizations over $1 trillion, are less sensitive to regulatory efforts
through monetary policy change.78 Consequently, policymakers and
regulators need to respond thoughtfully, strategically, and with growing
urgency. The benefits and challenges are such that governments are
looking to develop their own digital finance platforms in response, such
as CBDCs.79
In the next Section, we consider the major regulatory issues
applicable to BigTechs and other large digital finance platforms and
their global operations, starting with the question of whether existing
frameworks are sufficient to address the rising challenges and
opportunities from platformization of finance.
III. GOVERNING THE NEW “TOO-BIG” IN FINANCE: CHALLENGING
EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
In considering possible governance approaches to the emergence of
the new “too-big” in finance via platformization and the evolution of
BigTech and other large digital finance platforms, we begin with
existing regulatory approaches. Of the current frameworks available,
four are most relevant: financial regulation, antitrust and competition
regulation, telecommunications and internet regulation, and data
protection regulation.80 Each of these four areas is broad and includes

78. Romain Duval et al., Market Power and Monetary Policy Transmission 3
(IMF, Working Paper No. 2021/184, 2021), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/
Issues/2021/07/09/Market-Power-and-Monetary-Policy-Transmission-461332
[https://perma.cc/88TX-UMF5].
79. See CBDCs: An Opportunity for the Monetary System, BIS (June 23, 2021),
https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2021e3.htm [https://perma.cc/83JG-H2UY].
80. See, e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 22, at 71. It is worth
mentioning that tax law is another relevant area applicable to digital finance platforms.
Tax law is particularly relevant in the context of sustainable development where
inconsistent compliance with tax obligations can negatively affect developing
economies. See, e.g., Press Release, Econ. & Soc. Council, Corporate Tax Reform Must
Focus on Developing Countries’ Needs, Combating Inequality, Speakers Tell Special
Meeting of Economic and Social Council, U.N. Press Release ECOSOC/6978 (Apr. 29,
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requirements relating to establishment, consumer protection, disclosure
and reporting, and other regulations.81 Our analysis highlights that none
of the existing regulatory frameworks are sufficient to cover the range of
opportunities and risks raised by the emerging concentration and scale
of digital finance of FinTech 4.0.
A. FINANCIAL REGULATION
The first area of relevance is financial regulation. Over the past 150
years, financial regulation has evolved to address issues of financial
stability, market functioning and efficiency, financial integrity,
consumer and investor protection, and fairness.82 This scope is premised
upon the underlying view that finance is essential for sustainable
development but it is also necessary to control the various risks that
finance presents; thus, its regulation is a public good.83 Regulation has
generally arisen in response to societal harms that policymakers and the
public do not want to see repeated – namely financial crises, bank
failures, fraud and money laundering, abuse of consumers, and unfair
outcomes.84 Regulators are the representatives of society who are “paid
to worry” and mitigate these risks.85
With international financial regulation, international actors,
including regulators, coordinated and led by the G20 and the Financial
Stability Board (FSB) develop voluntary regulatory standards that are
then implemented by individual jurisdictions.86 A prominent example
are the Basel Capital Accords, developed by the Basel Committee on
2019), https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ecosoc6978.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/F4SK43AG].
81. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 22, at 68.
82. Id.
83. See Johannes Ehrentraud et al., Policy Responses to FinTech: A Cross-Country
Overview, BIS (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights23.htm
[https://perma.cc/U6WW-8FAM].
84. BUCKLEY & ARNER, supra note 7, at 14-15.
85. Thanks to Jon Frost for this. For a detailed discussion, see BUCKLEY & ARNER,
supra note 7, at 9.
86. The process of adoption normally includes high-level meetings and
consultations among regulators and central banks. See, e.g., The Basel Process –
Overview, BIS, https://www.bis.org/about/basel_process.htm [https://perma.cc/4Q4CFQ8W] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021). Moreover, regional organizations often have
jurisdiction to adopt directives and regulations with the latter being strictly enforceable
and the former being open to state interpretation.
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Banking Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
that sets standards regarding capital and liquidity risks to improve the
resilience of the banking sector.87 Similar voluntary standards can be
found in other areas of financial regulation such as securities (e.g.,
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation),88 financial market
infrastructure (e.g., Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure
(CPMI)-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures),89
investment (e.g., International Organization of Pension Supervisors
(IOPS) Principles of Private Pension Supervision),90 and others.91
At the national level, regulators take a range of approaches to
implementing international financial regulatory standards into their
national legal systems depending on the nature of the financial activities
in question.92 Implementation is monitored closely by the G20 and the
FSB for their members and by the IMF, World Bank, and individual
standard setters more broadly.93

87. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A Global Regulatory
Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems (June 2011). The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is the primary global standard setter for
the prudential regulation of banks and provides a forum for regular cooperation on
banking supervisory matters. Its 45 members comprise central banks and bank
supervisors from 28 jurisdictions. Id.
88. Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, FSB (May 31, 2017),
https://www.fsb.org/2017/05/cos_100601/ [https://perma.cc/P8H2-AU2B].
89. Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, BIS (Apr. 16, 2012),
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101.htm [https://perma.cc/SJ5L-88AX].
90. IOPS Principles and Guidelines, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION OF PENSION
SUPERVISORS, http://www.iopsweb.org/principlesandguidelines/ [https://perma.cc/
9XK8-D645] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
91. For a review of international financial standards in the context of sustainable
development, see U.N. ENVIRONMENT INQUIRY, A REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL STANDARDS AS THEY RELATE TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2017).
92. For a discussion of developing countries and their commitments to Basel
regulations, see Thorsten Beck et al., Basel Standards and Developing Countries: A
Difficult Relationship, VOXEU (Oct. 15, 2018), https://voxeu.org/article/baselstandards-and-developing-countries [https://perma.cc/379F-YU28].
93. See, e.g., BUCKLEY & ARNER, supra note 7, at 16.
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1. Objectives
At the core of financial regulation, particularly since the 2008 GFC,
is financial stability.94 Financial stability can be seen as the absence of
financial crises and, more positively, as a system which is resilient to
shocks and supports wider sustainable development.95 Financial stability
regulation takes a wide range of forms, with a focus on macroprudential
and microprudential regulation. Macroprudential regulation involves
seeking to prevent crises and focuses on interconnections across the
financial system.96 Microprudential regulation focuses on the safety and
soundness of individual financial institutions.97 Financial institutions are
prone to risks of contagious losses of confidence, which can result in
panic (i.e., a “bank run”) and potentially the collapse of that individual
institution and others from contagion across the wider financial
system.98 This is broadly acknowledged as “systemic risk.”99 Such risks
are tackled by both macroprudential and microprudential regulation.100
International financial regulation has tended to focus on the
identification of systemic risks, SIFIs, and related regulatory and
supervisory approaches, including capital, liquidity and leverage
requirements, enhanced supervision and disclosure, crisis contingency
planning, and failure resolution mechanisms.101 Such approaches extend
beyond traditional financial institutions to a range of financial market
infrastructure providers (FMIs) as well, such as payment and securities
settlement systems.102
From the standpoint of systemic risk, platformization and
digitalization are resulting in the emergence of new SIFIs. Clearly a
starting proposition is that these need to be governed by the existing
regulatory framework as they emerge.

94. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 208 (2008); JACEK
OSIŃSKI ET AL., MACROPRUDENTIAL AND MICROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES: TOWARD
COHABITATION 9 (2013), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2013/sdn1305.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZP9J-RD8E].
95. See Schwarcz, supra note 94, at 248.
96. See OSIŃSKI ET AL., supra note 94.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See generally Douglas Arner & Cyn-Young Park, Global Financial Regulatory
Reforms: Implications for Developing Asia (ADB, Working Paper No. 57, 2010).
102. Id.
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As a second objective, consumer protection seeks to safeguard
consumers from overreach by financial institutions, drive increased
confidence in the financial system, and reduce financial crime.103 This is
typically addressed by a combination of disclosure and behavioral
requirements, enforced through public agencies via criminal or civil
penalties (e.g., warnings, financial license suspensions, and bans on
products).104 Consumer protection has traditionally focused on
disclosure and conduct rather than possible abuses of data or
dominance.105
The third objective – market integrity – focuses on preventing the
criminal and terrorist use of the financial system, fraud, and market
manipulation.106 It focuses on a range of financial crimes, in particular
fraud, but also money laundering, terrorist financing, and market
abuse.107 This is an area where platformization potentially provides real
opportunities to better achieve regulatory and supervisory objectives.
2. Obstacles to Effective Financial Regulation of Digital Finance
Financial regulation generally requires companies to obtain special
licenses from relevant regulators to provide financial services. For
example, companies that wish to provide banking services need to
obtain a banking license and comply with a range of related regulatory

103. See, e.g., Good Practices for Financial Consumer Protection, WORLD BANK
GROUP (June 2012), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/26861 [https:
//perma.cc/4W3V-4CJT].
104. See, e.g., Press Release, European Securities and Market Authority, ESMA
Renews Binary Options Prohibition for a Further Three Months from 2 April 2019
(Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-renewsbinary-options-prohibition-further-three-months-2-april-2019 [https://perma.cc/96WRKSVR].
105. See, e.g., Brian Johnson, Deputy Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Address at
the Consumer Empowerment Conference: Toward a 21st Century Approach to
Consumer Protection, (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/toward-21st-century-approach-consumer-protection/
[https://perma.cc/CE45-FZ5S].
106. See e.g., Janet Austin, What Exactly is Market Integrity? An Analysis of One of
the Core Objectives of Securities Regulation, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 215, 227
(2017).
107. Id.
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standards.108 Most jurisdictions apply existing regulatory standards to
govern the activities of digital finance platforms in the financial
sector.109 Hence, if digital finance platforms want to engage in regulated
activities that require a license, they typically can do so by applying for
general (i.e., non-tech specific) financial licenses.110
Two problems arise with this approach for digital finance
platforms. First, such firms often do not apply for banking or other
licenses.111 To limit their regulatory compliance costs, these firms
typically provide financial services through existing financial
institutions without the need to apply for their own licenses (e.g.,
branded credit cards).112 This means platforms can potentially affect
financial markets while remaining beyond regulatory supervision.113
Second, it is not always apparent whether the financial activities of
digital finance platforms fall within the scope of relevant licensing or
other financial regulations.114 This is further exacerbated by the
platforms’ combination of digital technologies and business model
innovations that raise challenges around which regulations might apply
and how they might be executed.115 For example, money balances in
wallets or P2P lending might not fit under traditional approaches to
deposits and lending activities.116 Similarly, some blockchain-based
financial products such as digital tokens may fall under securities
regulation.117 However, how, when, and where these new digital

108. See Saule T. Omarova, Technology v Technocracy: FinTech as a Regulatory
Challenge, 6 J. FIN. REGUL. 75, 112 (2020).
109. See Ehrentraud et al., supra note 83; Juan Carlos Crisanto et al., BIG TECHS IN
FINANCE: REGULATORY APPROACHES AND POLICY OPTIONS 5 (2021),
https://www.bis.org/ fsi/fsibriefs12.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4WQ-N6DR].
110. See Ehrentraud et al., supra note 83, at 25.
111. FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 18.
112. Id.
113. See Zetzsche et al., supra note 5, at 413.
114. See Ehrentraud et al., supra note 83, at 29.
115. Croxson et al. supra note 46.
116. See, e.g., Johannes Ehrentraud et al., Denise Garcia Ocampo & Camila
Quevedo Vega, Regulating Fintech Financing: Digital Banks and Fintech Platforms,
BIS (Aug. 2020), https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights27.htm [https://perma.cc/TP5KZRUR].
117. See, e.g., Robert A. Schwinger, Changing Securities Laws and Regulations for
the Digital Token Age, N.Y.L.J. (2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/
2019/03/18/changing-securities-laws-and-regulations-for-the-digital-token-age/
[https://perma.cc/9LRQ-HU6N].
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products fall under existing rules is often far from clear in many
jurisdictions.118
Another major risk is “regulatory arbitrage,” structuring to avoid
regulation by transferring risk outside the regulated sector.119 Prevention
of regulatory arbitrage has emerged as a major financial regulatory
objective since 2008.120
To improve the licensing process and enhance competition, some
regulators have amended their regulatory frameworks to govern the
activities of digital finance platforms. For example, the U.S. Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) approved special national bank
charters for FinTech companies.121 The charters would be subject to a
similar regulatory framework to that which applies to banks but with
several relaxations such as exemptions from deposits requirements and
state money-transmitter laws.122 Meanwhile, other requirements that
apply to banks in the United States would extend to the special bank
charters for FinTech companies (including digital finance platforms).123
Similar developments can be found in other jurisdictions, such as
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, where
regulators allow FinTech companies to provide limited financial
services without fully complying with all regulatory standards.124
Reacting to the emergence of regulatory arbitrage and non-bank finance
in the context of digital finance platforms, China has recently
118.
119.

Id.
One potential way to address this problem is the adoption of a functional
approach to regulation. See Robert C. Merton, A Functional Perspective of Financial
Intermediation, 24 FIN. MGMT. 23, 39 (1995).
120. Danièle Nouy, Chair, ECB Supervisory Bd., Speech at the 33d SUERF
Colloquium, Helsinki: Gaming the Rules or Ruling the Game? – How to Deal with
Regulatory Arbitrage (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/
press/speeches/date/2017/html/ssm.sp170915.en.html [https://perma.cc/EBY3-HAAF].
121. See News Release, OCC Begins Accepting National Bank Charter Applications
from Financial Technology Companies (July 31, 2018), https://www.occ.gov/newsissuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html [https://perma.cc/FB63-GK6S]. See
generally JOSEPH M. OTTING, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY
COMPANIES’ ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY FOR NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS (2018),
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/pub-other-occ-policystatement-fintech.pdf?utm_campaign=ABA-Newsbytes080118&utm_medium=email&
utm_source=Eloqua [https://perma.cc/P3GM-STFT].
122. See Omarova, supra note 108, at 113.
123. Id. at 113.
124. Id. at 111.
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implemented a unified regulatory regime for firms engaging in financial
services-related business without distinctions from a technological
platform standpoint or otherwise.125
Besides licensing, other financial regulatory requirements may be
applicable to digital finance platforms, such as Know Your Customer
(KYC) and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) obligations and securities
regulations.126 These regulations are likewise designed to secure the
stability of the financial sector, deter criminal activities, and protect
consumers.127
3. Contribution to Innovation and Competition in Financial Services?
The promotion of innovation and competition in financial services
supports broader sustainable development.128 To bolster these goals,
many regulators have adopted “regulatory sandboxes” and “innovation
hubs.”129 Regulatory sandboxes include a wide range of programs run by
financial regulators to facilitate controlled testing of innovative financial
products or services on the market and examine their impact.130 In
particular, regulatory sandboxes allow FinTech companies and financial
firms to offer their products to customers while benefiting from a waiver
of, or reduction in, applicable regulations.131 Regulatory sandboxes
usually seek to foster innovation and competitiveness in financial
services, test the effects of new products and technologies on financial

125. See Zhong Xu & Ruihui Xu, Regulating Fintech for Sustainable Development
in the People’s Republic of China 14 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 1023,
2019).
126. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 22, at 68; Ehrentraud et al., supra
note 83, at 32.
127. Dirk Zetzsche et al., Digital ID and AML/CDD/KYC Utilities for Financial
Inclusion, Integrity, and Competition, 47 CAPCO INST. J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 133,
134 (2018).
128. See Sasin Kirakul et al., The Universe of Supervisory Mandates - Total Eclipse
of the Core?, BIS (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights30.htm
[https://perma.cc/HC55-37SC].
129. See Ross P. Buckley et al., Building Fintech Ecosystems: Regulatory
Sandboxes, Innovation Hubs and Beyond, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 55-56 (Mar.
31, 2020).
130. See Omarova, supra note 108, at 110 (2020); FInsight: Regulatory Sandboxes,
FIN. INST. HUB (Oct. 31, 2018), https://financialinstitutions.bakermckenzie.com/
2018/10/31/finsight-regulatory-sandboxes/ [https://perma.cc/US9E-5YFF].
131. See Omarova, supra note 108, at 110-11.

24

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

markets, and measure the effects of regulatory burdens.132 Regulatory
sandboxes are becoming increasingly popular as a way to support
sustainability in financial services.133
B. ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION REGULATION
The second area of regulatory activity relevant to the concentration
and dominance of finance via platformization is antitrust and
competition law. The purpose of antitrust and competition law is to
protect consumers and small businesses from abusive business practices
caused by a concentration of market power in the hands of dominant
firms.134 These laws help to maintain a competitive market environment
by limiting predatory business practices such as market allocation, bidrigging, price-fixing, and others.135 As such, antitrust and competition
laws apply to various economic activities that can intentionally or
unintentionally stifle competition.136 Since the late 1970s, considerations
of consumer cost and benefit have dominated the antitrust conversation,
especially in the United States.137
Similar to financial regulation, competition laws and policies are
developed nationally, regionally, and internationally. At the
international level, bodies such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Competition
Network (ICN), and the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
132. See Giulio Cornelli et al., Inside the Regulatory Sandbox: Effects on Fintech
Funding 1 (BIS, Working Paper No. 901, 2020), https://www.bis.org/publ/work901.htm
[https://perma.cc/L6NC-VEH8]. Further, regulatory sandboxes can pursue additional
goals such as female empowerment, like FCA’s TechSprint initiatives. Global AML and
Financial
Crime
TechSprint,
FIN.
CONDUCT
AUTH.
(2018),
https://www.fca.org.uk/events/techsprints/aml-financial-crime-international-techsprint
[https://perma.cc/63PB-AA63].
133. See, e.g., PHOEBE HIGGINS & TIMOTHY MALE, SANDBOXING NATURE: HOW
REGULATORY SANDBOXES COULD HELP RESTORE SPECIES, ENHANCE WATER QUALITY
AND BUILD BETTER HABITATS FASTER 9-10 (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/611cc20b78b5f677dad664ab/t/6178421d680175273724ebbb/1635271202429/Sa
ndboxing_Nature.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7ZV-2DEK].
134. Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare
Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2406 (2013).
135. See, e.g., ANTITRUST DIV. DEP’T JUST., PRICE FIXING, BID RIGGING, AND
MARKET ALLOCATION SCHEMES: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT TO LOOK FOR 1 (2005).
136. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 134, at 2406.
137. Id.
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(UNCTAD) develop voluntary recommendations, best practices, and
policy guidelines aimed at harmonizing competition laws across
different jurisdictions.138 In addition to multilateral cooperation,
regulators from different jurisdictions can adopt bilateral Memoranda of
Understanding (MoU) or collaboration agreements to harmonize the
enforcement of competition laws.139
At the national and regional level, regulators have broad discretion
in their approaches to competition policy and its goals. For example, the
United States and the European Union often pursue different goals with
their competition policies. In the United States, antitrust law is primarily
focused on the protection of consumer welfare;140 whereas, in the
European Union, competition law is aimed at both protecting consumers
and facilitating market integration.141 The difference in competition
policy goals translates into different regulatory requirements, for
example, the European Union has a much lower threshold for qualifying
economic activities as anticompetitive than does the United States.142

138. See, e.g., Recommendation of the Council on Competition Assessment, OECD
(Dec. 10, 2019), https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0455
[https://perma.cc/CC5K-UWHA] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022); International CoOperation in Competition, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/competition/internationalcooperationandcompetition.htm [https://perma.cc/XW33-8NAM] (last visited Jan. 17,
2022); UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., UNCTAD PERSPECTIVE ON
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 19 (2013), https://unctad.org/system/files/officialdocument/ditcclpmisc2013d2_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G5Z-D8NA].
139. See, e.g., OECD, INVENTORY OF PROVISIONS IN INTER-AGENCY CO-OPERATION
AGREEMENTS (MOUS) 3 (2016), https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplay
documentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WP3(2016)1/REV2&docLanguage=En
[https://perma.cc/Q8GP-BJD3].
140. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws
[https://perma.cc/G5MX-LKDC] (last visited Dec. 9, 2021).
141. See SHANKER SINGHAM, APPROACH OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO
COMPETITION IN THE HIGH TECHNOLOGY SECTOR 4 (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/
competition/information/digitisation_2018/contributions/epicenter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PZD-426Q].
142. See id.; Maria Coppola & Renato Nazzini, The European and U.S. Approaches
to Antitrust and Tech: Setting the Record Straight – A Reply to Gregory J. Werden and
Luke M. Froeb’s Antitrust and Tech: Europe and the United States Differ, and It
Matters, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (May 4, 2020), https://www.competitionpolicy
international.com/the-european-and-u-s-approaches-to-antitrust-and-tech-setting-therecord-straight-a-reply-to-gregory-j-werden-and-luke-m-froebs-antitrust-and-techeurope-and-the-united-states-differ/ [https://perma.cc/52ZC-AC3T].

26

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

Competition laws are becoming increasingly relevant for platform
finance. From the standpoint of consumer benefit, platform finance is
challenging dominant paradigms, particularly when considered against
wider questions of competition, innovation, inequality, and other aspects
of balanced sustainable development.143 In particular, BigTechs can
have significant advantages in data collection and digital infrastructure
control.144 These advantages can lead to conflicts of interest and allow
platforms to undermine market competition.145 For example, digital
finance platforms can maintain digital monopolies by acquiring smaller
competitors, thus solidifying their market position.146 Moreover, digital
finance platforms can raise entry barriers into financial and other
markets, use their data and dominant digital platforms to suppress
competition, and engage in other anticompetitive practices.147 Meta, for
example, has faced antitrust scrutiny and investigations in India, Turkey,
Argentina, the United Kingdom, and the European Union for changes to
its privacy policy and terms of service, which would allow it to collect
data without permission from its WhatsApp users in order to enhance
activities on the main Facebook platform.148
These risks attract the attention of regulators in both developed and
developing countries. In the United States, for example, the
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law
recently released a report on the state of competition in U.S. digital
markets.149 The report concluded that major tech companies have
significant market power that can undermine competition, warranting
antitrust reforms.150 Shortly after the report, the U.S. Department of
Justice filed an antitrust lawsuit against Google for maintaining a
143.
144.
145.
146.

Croxson et al., supra note 46.
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 22, at 73.
Id.
See, e.g., Mark Glick et al., Big Tech’s Buying Spree and the Failed Ideology of
Competition Law, 72 HASTINGS L.J. 465 (2021) (analyzing the acquisition of Instagram
and WhatsApp by Meta). See also SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L.
COMM. ON JUDICIARY, INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS 11 (2020)
[hereinafter, INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS].
147. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 22, at 67.
148. See Apurv Pratap Singh & Hrishav Kumar, Antitrust Regulators v. Big Tech:
The Battle Reaches India, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (July 22, 2021),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2021/07/antitrust-regulators-v-bigtech-battle-reaches-india [https://perma.cc/98MA-956Z].
149. INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 146.
150. Id. at 20.
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monopoly in internet search and search advertising markets. 151 Similar
developments are also happening in the European Union, where the
European Commission proposed a legislative initiative called The
Digital Services Act Package, which consists of the “Digital Markets
Act” and the “Digital Services Act”.152 The acts are designed to foster
competitiveness among digital services providers and to enhance the
protection of digital consumer rights by identifying “gatekeepers” and
imposing new obligations on digital service providers.153
In a similar vein, China’s State Administration for Market
Regulation has also initiated related processes, including new draft
guidelines on e-commerce and internet platforms.154 The guidelines
pursue several aims including the protection of fair competition, a
reduction in operator compliance costs, and the improvement of antimonopoly supervision in the internet sector.155 The regulations are likely
to affect China’s major companies, such as Tencent and Alibaba, by
imposing more restrictions on the use of subsidies, discounts, and other
business practices that can affect competition. India recently prohibited
e-commerce platforms from selling products from affiliated companies
to avoid potential conflicts of interest and concentration of market
power.156 Mexico’s recent FinTech law is intended to foster competition
and innovation through regulatory sandboxes and API-based open
access to data.157 These developments suggest that regulators around the
151. See Press Release, Dep’t Just., Justice Department Sues Monopolist Google for
Violating Antitrust Laws (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-sues-monopolist-google-violating-antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/HM3MRVQS].
152. See The Digital Services Act Package, EUR. COMM’N, https://digitalstrategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act-package [https://perma.cc/XPM2EGSX] (last updated Oct. 21, 2021).
153. Id.
154. See Leo Xin, China Drafts New Antitrust Guideline for Internet Companies,
PINSENT MASONS (Nov. 19, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.pinsentmasons.com/outlaw/news/china-drafts-new-antitrust-guideline-for-internet-companies
[https://perma.cc/Z66L-SGBU]; Press Release, Anti-Monopoly Bureau, Announcement
of the State Administration for Market Regulation on Public Consultation on the
“Guidelines for Anti-Monopoly in the Field of Platform Economy (Draft for
Comment),” (Nov. 11, 2020), http://www.samr.gov.cn/hd/zjdc/202011/t20201109_
323234.html [https://perma.cc/L5FE-9QS8].
155. Id.
156. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 22, at 73.
157. See Digital Disruption in Banking and its Impact on Competition, supra note
56, at 27.
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world will continue to re-examine their existing competition laws to
tackle the risks arising from digital finance platforms.158
Competition laws remain relevant for sustainable development
where they can serve to limit the negative impacts of digital finance
platforms.159 For example, while competition can decrease costs of
financial services, thus potentially contributing to economic growth and
the reduction of poverty,160 the concentration of market power due to
platform finance can undermine the resilience of incumbent business
models.161 Additionally, the dominant market position of multinational
digital finance platforms can undermine investment in, and the
development of, emerging local enterprises.162 These challenges mean
that regulators must strengthen their antitrust competition policies to
limit the potential negative impacts of digital finance platforms on
sustainable development.163
Consequently, antitrust and competition law are being called on to
play an increasing role in balancing the advantages and risks of platform
finance.
C. TELECOMMUNICATION AND INTERNET REGULATION
Telecommunications and internet regulations are also highly
relevant. At the international level, the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) sets general principles regarding telecom services and the
interconnection and interoperability of telecom facilities.164 The main
objectives of the ITU are the facilitation of global telecom
interconnection and interoperability, the promotion of efficient and
accessible telecom services, and the standardization of general
principles on the provision and operation of international telecoms. 165 To
achieve these goals, the ITU facilitates the adoption of international
treaties on telecom regulation, such as the International
Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs), and develops non-binding
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See, e.g., Croxson et al. supra note 46.
Id.
BigTech Firms in Finance, supra note 16, at 16.
Id.
See Feyen et al., supra note 15.
See, e.g., Croxson et al. supra note 46.
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, FINAL ACTS
WORLD CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1 (2012).
165. Id. at 1-2.
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recommendations on telecom operations for national implementation by
states.166 Besides the ITU, international organizations such as the U.N.
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the OECD
develop policy recommendations and treaties on internet governance
and e-commerce.167 Their initiatives are designed to ensure greater
consistency across national and international telecoms laws and
policies.168
In respect to the internet, non-profit organizations play an important
role. For example, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) is a non-profit corporation that works with internet
registries and registrars to promote greater competition on the internet
(e.g., accessible domains), to facilitate dispute resolution over domain
ownership, and to promote new top-level domains.169 Unlike top-down
governance models, ICANN operates on a community-driven consensus
model to monitor how the internet domain system functions and
develops.170 Similarly, other areas of the internet are governed by
organizations such as the American Registry for Internet Numbers (IPaddress management), the Internet Governance Forum (promotion of
stakeholder cooperation), and the Internet Engineering Task Force
(voluntary internet protocol suite).171
At the regional and national levels, telecoms regulators pursue
diverse tasks such as consumer protection, interoperability of telecom
services, fair competition among telecom service providers, data
166. Focus on ITU’s Areas of Work, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION,
https://www.itu.int/en/history/Pages/FocusOnITUAreasOfWork.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Z9UK-6U5M] (last visited Dec. 9, 2021).
167. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications
in International Contracts, Mar. 1, 2013, 2898 U.N.T.S. 3; OECD, PRINCIPLES FOR
INTERNET POLICY MAKING 2 (2014), https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdprinciples-for-internet-policy-making.pdf [https://perma.cc/598Y-G3H3].
168. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications
in International Contracts, supra note 167; OECD, supra note 167.
169. See What’s the Effect of ICANN’s Role and Work on the Internet?, ICANN
(Feb. 25, 2012), https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/effect-2012-02-25-en [https://
perma.cc/52JN-FDZR].
170. ICANN, BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO PARTICIPATING IN ICANN 2 (2012),
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/participating-08nov13-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ER8V-RQLY].
171. See What is Internet Governance?, INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT (2021),
https://www.internetgovernance.org/what-is-internetgovernance/#:~:text=Internet%20governance%20refers%20to%20the,UDP%2C%20D
NS%20and%20BGP [https://perma.cc/8ZCC-KE4N].
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security and data privacy, and cybersecurity.172 For example, the
European Union adopted a range of directives on electronic
communications networks and services to facilitate competition in the
telecommunications sectors.173 Similar regulatory developments are
found in other regional and national jurisdictions.174
Digital finance platforms’ activities can sometimes fall within the
scope of telecommunication laws.175 A number of telecommunication
companies, such as mobile network operators (MNOs), have ventured
into the provision of digital financial services.176 In developing countries
in particular, MNOs have provided financial services at scale to
previously unbanked populations.177 One of the most prominent
examples is M-PESA, a mobile money service originally launched in
Kenya by Safaricom.178 The importance of such innovative MNOs for
sustainable development is their ability to broaden the ecosystem of
financial services available to neglected populations in rural areas
through the creation of digital wallets for transactions, the ability to
deposit or withdraw cash through vast networks of physical agents, and
the offering of credit and insurance services.179
While the financial services provided by MNOs are typically
governed by financial, competition, and data regulations,

172.
173.

OECD, supra note 139, at 4.
See, e.g., European Parliament and Council Regulation 910/2014 of 23 July
2014, Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions in the
Internal Market and Repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, 2014 O.J. (L 257) 73-114.
174. See generally Hunter Whaley, Research Guide: International Internet Law,
COLUM. U. (2019), http://library.law.columbia.edu/guides/International_Internet_Law#
Agreements [https://perma.cc/3HFB-7ZZ7] (last modified Nov. 22, 2019, 4:36 PM).
175. See LEON PERLMAN, ROLE OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATOR IN
DIGITAL FINANCIAL SERVICES 7-8 (2018); Ross P. Buckley & Louise Malady, Building
Consumer Demand for Digital Financial Services – The New Regulatory Frontier Part I, 131 BANKING L.J. 834, 836 (2014).
176. Id.
177. See PERLMAN, supra note 175, at 10.
178. See What is M-Pesa?, VODAFONE, https://www.vodafone.com/what-wedo/services/m-pesa [https://perma.cc/3HFB-7ZZ7] (last visited Dec. 7, 2021).
179. See Evan Gibson et al., Regulating Digital Financial Services Agents in
Developing Countries to Promote Financial Inclusion, 2015 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 26,
26 (2015). See generally Leo Van Hove & Antoine Dubus, M-PESA and Financial
Inclusion in Kenya: Of Paying Comes Saving?, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 568 (2019).
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telecommunications authorities play a supporting role.180 For example,
telecommunication
authorities
license
the
provision
of
telecommunication services and thus regulate the non-financial elements
of MNOs’ business models.181 Moreover, telecommunication authorities
can supervise network security, assist in KYC via subscriber identity
modules (SIM) or other authentication regulation, and monitor the
service quality and fair competition in the telecommunication services,
all of which are relevant for the underlying infrastructure of digital
finance.182
The provision of financial services by MNOs raises questions about
the role of telecommunication authorities in the governance of digital
finance. In most countries, financial and telecommunication regulators
need to work more closely together to develop technology that can
advance financial inclusion, and, therefore, sustainable development.183
In particular, regulatory supervision of broadband standards and prices,
combined with accessible and clear regulatory requirements for the
provision of digital financial services by MNOs, offer great potential to
significantly contribute to financial inclusion.184 In general, therefore,
greater attention needs to be given to the role of telecommunication
authorities in facilitating the provision of digital financial services.
provision of digital financial services
D. DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY REGULATION
Data protection and privacy regulation is the fourth area of
regulatory activity relevant to digital finance platforms.185 The purpose
of data privacy regulation is the protection of personally identifiable
180. See PERLMAN, supra note 175, at 15; Annie Tsoi et al., China Passes New Ecommerce Law - A “Safe Harbour” with Chinese Characteristics, DEACONS, https://
www.deacons.com/news-and-insights/publications/china-passes-new-e-commerce-lawa-safe-harbour-with-chinese-characteristics.html [https://perma.cc/G58D-DVWP] (last
updated Oct. 15, 2018) (illustrating China’s recent e-commerce law that imposes
business registration, IP and data liability, and other obligations on both telecom and
non-telecom companies that provide e-commerce services as described).
181. PERLMAN, supra note 175.
182. Id. at 46.
183. THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GEN.’S TASK FORCE ON DIGIT. FIN.
SUSTAINABLE DEV. GOALS, PEOPLE’S MONEY: HARNESSING DIGITALIZATION TO
FINANCE A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (2020), https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/
files/df_task_force_-_full_report_-_aug_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY6B-R9ND].
184. Id. at 15.
185. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 22, at 69.

32

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

information from unlawful or unethical use.186 In addition to data
privacy, data regulation increasingly extends more broadly to other
forms of data as well as to cybersecurity considerations.187 To protect
personal data, relevant regulations can, among other things, impose
restrictions on the collection and processing of personal information,
require firms to comply with data security standards, and confine data
collection to specific purposes.188
Contrary to competition and financial regulations that aim to
govern economic activities, data privacy laws often originate from
human rights law and the right to privacy.189 As a result, the scope of
privacy law has traditionally been confined to the protection of
individuals and their private life from public and private interference.190
However, the use of data in financial and other markets pushed
regulators to consider the economic implications of data privacy and
widen their regulatory approaches.191
In particular, recent cases involving the unethical collection and use
of data by BigTech companies pushed regulators around the world to reexamine their existing data protection policies.192 One of the most

186. See, e.g., European Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/679 of 27 April
2016, Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L
119) 1, art. 5 [hereinafter G.D.P.R.].
187. See, Douglas W. Arner, et al., The Transnational Data Governance Problem,
BERKLEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2022); Ross P. Buckley et al., The Dark Side of
Digital Financial Transformation: The New Risks of FinTech and the Rise of TechRisk,
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming).
188. PERLMAN, supra note 175, at 14.
189. For example, the international right to privacy is enshrined in Article 12 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (U.D.H.R.) and Article 17 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (I.C.C.P.R.). Regionally, the right is enshrined
in, for example, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (E.C.H.R.) and
Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights. See generally Oliver
Diggelmann & Maria Nicole Cleis, How the Right to Privacy Became a Human Right,
14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 441 (2014).
190. See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
222.
191. See YAN CARRIÈRE-SWALLOW & VIKRAM HAKSAR, THE ECONOMICS AND
IMPLICATIONS OF DATA: AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE 36 (2019); Feyen et al., supra
note 15.
192. See Cambridge Analytica, GDPR - 1 Year On - a Lot of Words and Some
Action, PRIV. INT’L (Apr. 30, 2019),
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notable developments in this area is the European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), which imposes data privacy protection
obligations on companies that hold, collect, or process the data of
natural persons within the European Union.193 Among various other
obligations, the GDPR requires companies to process data in a “lawful
and transparent manner” and solely for specific purposes.194 Moreover,
companies must ensure that the collected data is sufficiently secure and
that the scope of data collection is limited to only what is absolutely
necessary to conduct business activities (i.e., the “data minimization”
principle).195 The GDPR also contains strict sanctions, and companies
can be fined for up to 4 percent of their revenue for data privacy and
security violations.196
While the GDPR is arguably one of the most robust data privacy
regulations in the world, other countries and jurisdictions have adopted
or are planning to adopt their own similarly strong data privacy
regulations. Among notable developments, China has recently enacted a
new Personal Information Protection Law which resembles the GDPR
and outlines the rules regarding the collection, transfer, and use of
personal data in China or that relates to China’s residents.197 Combined
with previous data privacy regulations and new antitrust guidelines,
China is likely to continue its push for stronger data and data monopoly
governance in the financial sector.198 Similarly, other major economies,
https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/2857/cambridge-analytica-gdpr-1-yearlot-words-and-some-action [https://perma.cc/LY79-FX8G].
193. G.D.P.R., supra note 186, at art. 3. It should be noted that one of the principal
architects of the GDPR, Axel Voss, recently called for an overhaul of the data
protection regime to better account for the post-pandemic world. See Javier Espinosa,
EU Must Overhaul Flagship Data Protection Laws, Says a ‘Father’ of Policy, FIN.
TIMES (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/b0b44dbe-1e40-4624-bdb1e87bc8016106 [https://perma.cc/83LR-EZUZ].
194. G.D.P.R., supra note 186, at art. 5.
195. Id.
196. Id. at art. 83; Natasha Lomas, French Court Slaps Down Google’s Appeal
Against $57M GDPR Fine, TECH CRUNCH (June 19, 2020, 10:04 PM), https://tech
crunch.com/2020/06/19/french-court-slaps-down-googles-appeal-against-57m-gdprfine/ [https://perma.cc/9WPR-LRSP].
197. Gil Zhang & Kate Yin, A Look at China’s Draft of Personal Information
Protection Law, IAPP (Oct. 26, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/a-look-at-chinas-draftof-personal-data-protection-law/ [https://perma.cc/PK9E-C5EA].
198. See, e.g., Xi’s Next Target in Tech Crackdown Is China’s Vast Reams of Data,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 23, 2021, 2:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2021-04-23/xi-s-next-target-in-tech-crackdown-is-china-s-vast-reams-of-
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including the United States, are considering the adoption of new data
security legislation.199
In the context of sustainable development, data privacy regulations
can mitigate the risks associated with the broad adoption of technology
by digital finance platforms and other companies.200 The ability of
digital finance platforms to collect and analyze private data on a large
scale, combined with their control of major digital platforms, can
severely undermine fair competition and decrease market
contestability.201 For example, unregulated digital finance platforms can
have unfair data advantages over traditional financial institutions.202 The
unfair advantages arise from the digital finance platforms’ ability to
track consumer habits and transactions online, and sometimes offline, in
a way that enables them to offer better tailored products and access to
financial services, such as credit or insurance.203 This can lead to
volatility in the financial markets due to the inability of incumbent
financial institutions to compete with the digital finance platforms and
their data advantages.204 Moreover, digital finance platforms’ unchecked
data monopoly can lead to price and client discrimination in financial
services.205 The problem of data and market power concentration is
particularly relevant for developing economies where major companies

data [https://perma.cc/8EYN-4MBS]; Arjun Kharpal, In a Quest to Rein in Its Tech
Giants, China Turns to Data Protection, CNBC (Apr. 11, 2021, 10:57 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/12/china-data-protection-laws-aim-to-help-rein-incountrys-tech-giants.html [https://perma.cc/QPQ7-DJ28].
199. See e.g., OECD, OECD DIGITAL ECONOMY OUTLOOK 2020 (2020),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/153ac49fen/index.html?itemId=/content/component/153ac49f-en [https://perma.cc/9H4Z-B73L];
DEP’T FOR DIGIT., CULTURE MEDIA & SPORT, Data: A New Direction (Sept. 10, 2021),
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/data-a-new-direction
[https://perma.cc/SRT3-K5ZW] (proposing a new data security approach in the United
Kingdom).
200. See Feyen et al., supra note 15.
201. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 22, at 73.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 67. For example, digital finance platforms can use private data to detect
clients who are willing to pay higher premiums for financial services.
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can undermine local competition and innovation.206 In this context, data
privacy laws can help to address the risks of data monopolies by limiting
the rights of private companies regarding the collection and use of
data.207
In addition to addressing economic and financial risks, data privacy
regulations can help maintain the integrity of and trust in public
institutions. The recent scandals with Meta and Cambridge Analytica
show that unchecked data collection and analysis can lead to the spread
of misinformation and manipulation of public opinion, both of which
have significant negative repercussions.208 The integrity of public
institutions can be intentionally or unintentionally undermined by the
unchecked use of private data.209 To mitigate these risks, data privacy
regulations can play an important role in limiting potentially negative
corollary impacts of digital finance platforms.
IV. A PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE OF FINTECH
4.0
As the BIS concluded in 2021, none of the existing regulatory
approaches are sufficient to address all of the issues raised by the
emergence of dominant digital finance platforms.210 It is necessary to
build mechanisms capable of bridging these regulatory silos and their
disparate objectives and approaches.
We argue that the layers of this complexity, across subject matters
and regulatory scope and competence, necessitate a flexible approach to
regulation – one that can encourage, accommodate, and temper rapid
innovation in FinTech 4.0. Such flexibility is more likely found in a
principles-based approach.211

206. See, e.g., Kristalina Georgieva et al., Rising Market Power – A Threat to the
Recovery?, IMF BLOG (Mar. 15, 2021), https://blogs.imf.org/2021/03/15/rising-marketpower-a-threat-to-the-recovery/ [https://perma.cc/3MEH-HXPS].
207. See Feyen et al., supra note 15.
208. See Karen Kornbluh, Could Europe’s New Data Protection Regulation Curb
Online Disinformation?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Feb. 20, 2018, 10:00 AM),
https://www.cfr.org/blog/could-europes-new-data-protection-regulation-curb-onlinedisinformation [https://perma.cc/6EFX-4DSM].
209. Id.
210. See Carstens et al., supra note 3, at 4.
211. See Julia Black, Paradoxes and Failures: ‘New Governance’ Techniques and
the Financial Crisis, 75 MOD. L. REV. 1037, 1059 n.101 (2012); FIN. SERV. AUTH.,
PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON THE OUTCOME THAT MATTERS 2 (2007),
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Principles, as opposed to rules, provide greater flexibility for all
participants within an ecosystem, including both regulators and
regulatees.212 They can provide guidance for normatively good conduct
that minimizes negative impacts while promoting positive outcomes.213
Moreover, a principles-based approach provides a means for regulators
and policymakers to allow and encourage rapid innovation, as we find
with FinTech, while retaining the capacity to temper it through the
imposition of appropriate guardrails against risks and negative
externalities.
Consequently, in this Section, we suggest five principles upon
which to build digital finance platform governance frameworks: (1)
ensuring foundational financial regulatory objectives; (2) developing
reflexive and iterative regulation; (3) fostering responsible actors; (4)
ensuring appropriate, balanced, and proportional oversight and
enforcement; and (5) instilling a commitment to sustainable
development.
A. PRINCIPLE ONE: ENSURING FOUNDATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATORY
OBJECTIVES
As discussed in Part III above, financial regulation is built upon
four key foundations: financial stability, consumer protection, market
integrity, and fair competition.214 As BigTechs provide financial services
and enter financial markets, it is imperative that regulators and
policymakers remain focused on these foundational objectives,
particularly with new actors that are not native to the financial sector.
While data protection and telecommunications regulation are highly
relevant in FinTech 4.0, the focus on these elements should supplement,
but not replace, the foundational factors.

https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20081112165843/http://www.fsa.go
v.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5J5-5EXY].
212. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 557 (1992); Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial Innovation: A More PrinciplesBased Proposal?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273, 278 (2011).
213. See Awrey, supra note 212, at 287.
214. See Carstens et al., supra note 3, at 3.
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B. PRINCIPLE TWO: DEVELOPING REFLEXIVE AND ITERATIVE
REGULATION
Policymakers and regulators need to adopt an approach to
regulation that is both reflexive and iterative. This is underlined by two
realities of large digital finance platforms: first, the technology they
employ is developing rapidly, and second, the societal capacity to
engage with that technology varies widely (particularly in emerging
market and developing countries).215 This includes the capacity of
regulators, consumers, and infrastructure.216 Subsequently, regulatory
interventions will need to be targeted and includes mechanisms that
allow for rapid review and adaptation.
When discussing societal capacity, we refer to three constitutive
parts: that of regulators, consumers, and infrastructure. Regulatory
capacity is the ability of regulators to oversee and manage these
activities and entities.217 The capacity of users and consumers is linked
to their ability to engage with the technology.218 For example, segments
of the population in all countries (and especially EMDEs) may be
financially illiterate or excluded, or technologically illiterate or
excluded.219 Finally, capacity includes the infrastructure necessary to
support the technology which and upon which large digital finance
platforms operate, from data servers to telecommunication networks to

215. Technology
&
Innovation
Report
2021,
UNCTAD
(2021),
https://unctad.org/page/technology-and-innovation-report-2021 [https://perma.cc/SC2T5E2G]. See also MARIANNA MAZZUCATO ET AL., COVID-19 AND THE NEED FOR
DYNAMIC STATE CAPABILITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (Apr. 2021),
https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/publications/UNDP-UNCL-IIPPCOVID-19-and-the-Need-for-Dynamic-State-Capabilities.pdf [https://perma.cc/SSP2NHV7].
216. Technology & Innovation Report 2021 supra note 215; MAZZUCATO ET AL.
supra note 215.
217. Colin Scott & Ciara Brown, Regulatory Capacity and Networked Governance
1 (UCD Greary Institute Rsch. Paper Series, 2010), https://www.ucd.ie/geary/static/
publications/workingpapers/gearywp201043.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YW8-9GSB].
218. Technology & Innovation Report 2021, supra note 216. PEOPLE’S MONEY:
HARNESSING DIGITALIZATION TO FINANCE A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, supra note 183.
219. Id. See also Meetings Coverage, General Assembly, Nearly Half of World’s
Population Excluded from ‘Benefits of Digitalization’, Speaker Stresses as Second
Committee Debates Information Technology for Development, U.N. Meetings
Coverage GA/EF/3523 (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gaef3523.
doc.htm [https://perma.cc/7FZ3-9RZH].
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electric power grids.220 Often, EMDEs are lacking in these areas relative
to the more advanced economies where digital finance platforms may be
domiciled, and BigTechs may in fact be a major source to increase
digital and financial access and inclusion via technology platforms in
EMDEs.221 As such, all countries, but particularly EMDEs, will need to
deploy a reflexive and iterative approach to policy and regulation. This
should entail an appropriate mix of substantive regulation coupled with
mechanisms that give authorities sufficient flexibility to reflect on, and
adapt to, developments as required.
Substantively, national regulators will need to adopt relevant
regulations that promote public welfare through efficiency, fair
competition, financial stability, market integrity, and consumer
protection. The important corollary to substantive regulations, however,
is the regulatory mechanisms that allow for reflexivity and iteration.

A representation of a “reflexive and iterative” regulatory process
Plan

Reflect

Act

There are several ways regulators can embed feedback loops into
the process as they develop policies and regulations. These include
innovation hubs, regulatory sandboxes, and transnational regulatory
networks.222
Innovation hubs usually provide a specific place where firms can
engage with regulators to raise questions and seek clarifications or nonbinding guidance about FinTech-related issues. This can include
compliance with the regulatory framework, licensing or registration

220.
221.

Technology & Innovation Report 2021, supra note 215.
See id.; PEOPLE’S MONEY: HARNESSING DIGITALIZATION TO FINANCE A
SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, supra note 183.
222. Ross P. Buckley et al., Building FinTech Ecosystems: Regulatory Sandboxes,
Innovation Hubs and Beyond, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 55 (2020).
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requirements, and regulatory and supervisory expectations, for
example.223
Regulatory sandboxes, as discussed above, go a step further and
provide a safe harbor in which companies can test innovative financial
products, services, or business models. Such testing is done with actual
customers and in a controlled environment (the “sandbox”) pursuant to a
specific testing plan agreed upon with the regulatory supervisor and
subject to the application of distinct safeguards.224
The utility of these mechanisms is their ability to facilitate a
collaborative partnership between regulators and technology firms. As
financial service provision may be relatively nascent in developing
countries, there is great opportunity to innovate and create financial
services and products that enhance financial inclusion and promote
sustainable development.225 Innovation hubs and regulatory sandboxes
are useful as they can both support industry innovation and enable
regulators to anticipate, and prepare for, proposed innovations.226
Innovation hubs and regulatory sandboxes require highly skilled
staff with expertise in FinTech regulation and the local regulatory
schema.227 Some sort of exchange program, for example, may well assist
both developed and developing countries. For the developing country, it
would be an opportunity to learn about more mature or advanced
regulatory practices, policies, and procedures. For the developed country
regulators, it would be an opportunity to study some of the innovative
strategies EMDEs are implementing and to consider the likely impacts
in global markets and transactions. This could be a mutually beneficial,
and hopefully ongoing, collaborative endeavor.
Transnational regulatory networks can be of further assistance to
the extent that they allow regulators in both developed and developing
economies to interact in a more informal manner and share techniques,
approaches, and lessons learned.228 One example of a prominent
transnational regulatory network is the Financial Action Task Force
223.
224.

Id.
See EUR. SEC. & MKT. AUTH. ET AL., FINTECH: REGULATORY SANDBOXES AND
INNOVATION HUBS 5 (2018), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/
jc_2018_74_joint_report_on_regulatory_sandboxes_and_innovation_hubs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y7MA-SX98].
225. PEOPLE’S MONEY: HARNESSING DIGITALIZATION TO FINANCE A SUSTAINABLE,
supra note 183.
226. See Zetzsche et al., supra note 5, at 31.
227. Buckley et al., supra note 222.
228. See, e.g., Scott & Brown, supra note 217.
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(FATF).229 The FATF is the global money laundering and terrorist
financing standard-setting organization.230 It draws its membership from
financial regulatory authorities across 37 jurisdictions and other
international organizations.231 Its reach, however, goes far beyond its
membership. Collectively, the body sets standards and promotes the
effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and operational measures
for combating money laundering, terrorism financing, and other related
threats to the integrity of the international financial system.232 Most
recently, this has come to include the risks posed by virtual assets such
as cryptocurrencies.233 By developing appropriate standards to match
new practices that pose financial market risks, the FATF helps its
members implement matching regulatory standards to manage risks as
they arise.234
Another example of a prominent transnational regulatory network
is the Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN), which was formally
launched in early 2019 by a group of international regulators.235 It now
comprises “a network of over 60 organizations committed to supporting
financial innovation in the interests of consumers. It seeks to provide a
more efficient way for innovative firms to interact with regulators,
229. Stavros Gadinis, Three Pathways to Global Standards: Private, Regulator, and
Ministry Networks, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2015).
230. About, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/6WDG-4LYK] (last visited Dec. 9, 2021).
231. Id.
232. See What We Do, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (2020), https://www.fatfgafi.org/about/whatwedo/ [https://perma.cc/QM7B-TDAQ] (last visited Dec.10, 2021).
One of the potential drawbacks of the FATF or other similar organizations is selective
membership that often excludes least developed countries (LDCs). This, in turn, can
lead to the proliferation of regulatory standards that can be implemented by developed
economies but not by LDCs. This could exacerbate the vulnerable position of LDCs
that may struggle to enter into developed markets due to a lack of resources to ensure
regulatory compliance with international standards. To remedy this situation,
international regulatory frameworks should include or consult regulators from LDCs to
ensure that international standards do not negatively affect financial or other institutions
in LDCs.
233. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, UPDATED GUIDANCE FOR A RISK-BASED APPROACH
TO VIRTUAL ASSETS AND VIRTUAL ASSET SERVICE PROVIDERS (2021), https://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Updated-Guidance-VA-VASP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/577S-ZFM4].
234. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 233.
235. See The Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN), GFIN,
www.thegfin.com [https://perma.cc/E25T-KGHY] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
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helping them navigate between countries as they look to scale ideas.”236
The GFIN assists firms that are piloting products in more than one
market, and seeks to build bridges between markets for innovative
FinTechs.237
As EMDEs grow in their regulatory capacity, there will also be
more room to increase the use of technology for regulatory and
supervisory purposes, as well as to build fundamental digital
infrastructure through RegTech and SupTech and their increasingly
powerful and sophisticated capabilities.238 RegTech and SupTech
describe the use of technology and technological processes to
implement, comply with, and monitor regulatory requirements and
objectives.239 Implementing regulation through technology requires
resources and trained staff. It will also require countries to have
significantly more sophisticated digital infrastructures, such as digital
identities, e-KYC initiatives, and robust data protection.240
Finally, for each of the mechanisms discussed in this Section, it is
worthwhile for regulators and policymakers to contemplate the form or
configuration that it should take. Different configurations can enhance
efficiencies, capacity building, and overall effectiveness. We discuss
this further in Principle Four below, on Oversight and Enforcement.

236.
237.
238.

Id.
Id.
See Douglas W. Arner et al., FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of
Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 373, 381 (2017).
239.
Technology and innovation are transforming the global financial
landscape, presenting opportunities, risks and challenges for
regulated institutions and authorities alike. A significant area of
innovation is the application of new technologies to help authorities
to improve their supervisory capabilities – known as ‘SupTech’ --[sic] and by institutions to meet their regulatory requirements –
known as ‘RegTech.’
FIN. STABILITY BOARD, THE USE OF SUPERVISORY AND REGULATORY TECHNOLOGY BY
AUTHORITIES AND REGULATED INSTITUTIONS 1 (2020), https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/P091020.pdf [https://perma.cc/WY9Y-A7UN].
240. Nora Gurung & Leon Perlman, Use of Regtech by Central Banks and Its
Impact on Financial Inclusion, SSRN (Nov. 16, 2018), https://dfsobservatory.com/
sites/default/files/REGTECH%20%26%20Central%20Banks%20-%20PUBLIC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VHF9-PLD6].
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C. PRINCIPLE THREE: FOSTERING RESPONSIBLE, LONG-TERM ORIENTED
ACTORS
As the world becomes more attuned to the impacts of corporations
on the environment and society, it is increasingly important to ensure
that such actors, including digital finance platforms, work to minimize
and mitigate their negative impacts. This is particularly true in light of
the many inequities manifesting during the COVID-19 pandemic and
other evolving sustainability crises, including global climate change.241
Given the variance of national regulatory systems and the opportunities
for arbitrage, there is merit in considering the direct application of
transnational standards of responsible business conduct on digital
finance platforms. Examples of relevant and pertinent instruments
include the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights242
(“UN Guiding Principles”) and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises (“OECD Guidelines”).243
Having been endorsed unanimously by the U.N. Human Rights
Council in 2011, the benefit of the U.N. Guiding Principles is their
universal, global scope.244 However, they are limited to human rights.
On the other hand, the OECD Guidelines, while limited in scope
primarily to companies whose home states are OECD members, offer a
broader swathe of standards for responsible business conduct.245 In
addition to human rights recommendations, the OECD Guidelines
241. Reimagining the Global Economy: Building Back Better in a Post-COVID-19
World, BROOKINGS (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapterreport/reimagining-the-global-economy-building-back-better-in-a-post-covid-19-world/
[https://perma.cc/UKT8-78AV].
242. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/65/310 (Aug. 19, 2010).
243. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES (June 27, 2000), https://www.refworld.org/docid/425bd34c4.html
[https://perma.cc/NS5C-GFYF] [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES].
244. U.N. Hum. Rts. Off. High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011), https://www.ohchr.org/
documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/49433ZKQ] [hereinafter Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights].
245. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 243. See also The OECD Guidelines, OECD
WATCH (2011), https://www.oecdwatch.org/oecd-ncps/the-oecd-guidelines-for-mnes/
[https://perma.cc/F54V-RW8T].
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provide standards on responsible conduct in relation to tax, anticorruption and anti-bribery, the environment, labor rights, and others. 246
Regulators could also consider other standards and initiatives, such as
the U.N. Global Compact.247
In line with the adage that “justice should not only be done, but
should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done,”248 digital
finance platforms should engage in two further practices to enhance
their business conduct: due diligence and reporting. Due diligence
involves implementing appropriate risk assessment and management
systems (policies, procedures, and processes) across a company’s
operations.249 These methods enable a company to identify, assess,
manage, and address risks with respect to various environmental and
social impacts.250 Relatedly, digital finance platforms should be required
to disclose and report on the results of their due diligence exercises,
highlighting salient risks and their plans to manage or remediate
consequential negative impacts.
D. PRINCIPLE FOUR: ENSURING OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT
The application of standards to digital finance platforms directly, as
proposed in the principle above, should be matched with appropriate
oversight and enforcement mechanisms, which ideally would benefit
from RegTech and SupTech. Given the complexity of the actors and the
activities in discussion, oversight and enforcement mechanisms should
be deployed at various levels of digital finance platform operation and
impact. This will affect actors and regulators at the entity, national,
international, and transnational levels, which means that regulators and
policymakers need to consider two guiding features: form and function.

246.
247.

Id.
The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, U.N. GLOB. COMPACT,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html
[https://perma.cc/K7JM-BBCB] (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
248. See R v. Sussex Justices, ex p McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, [1923] EWHC KB
1. McCarthy is a leading English case on the impartiality and recusal of judges which
brought into common parlance this oft-quoted aphorism.
249. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 244, at 16-20
(Principles 17-21). See also Jonathan Bonnitcha & Robert McCorquodale, The Concept
of ‘Due Diligence’ in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 28
EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 899, 900 (2017).
250. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 244, at 16-20
(Principles 17-21); Bonnitcha & McCorquodale, supra note 249.
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Put another way, authorities should consider what they are trying to
achieve, how they should organize themselves, and who will be
important in helping them.
On the matter of form, various configurations are possible:
 Entity-based – this involves action within the firm itself.
Potential initiatives can include independent advisory councils, such
as the Facebook Oversight Board.251
 Intra-jurisdiction – this involves collaboration among different
regulatory authorities within a particular jurisdiction that all have a
role to play in the regulation of financial markets (e.g., competition,
finance, and telecommunications supervisors).
 Inter-jurisdiction – this involves regulatory authorities
separately or collectively within a jurisdiction collaborating with
other regulators across borders. This could be developed between
country-to-developing country or developing country-to-developing
country.
 Regional – this would involve regional collaboration (such as
within the European Union, African Union, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, or the Southern Common Market) or interregional collaboration.
 Global – this entails fora such as the UN, G20, IMF, BIS,
OECD, and FSB.

This range of configurations gives policymakers the flexibility to
develop appropriate regulation and oversight mechanisms while keeping
in mind geographic, cultural, political, and economic considerations.
Countries should be encouraged, and given the opportunity, to
participate directly. The idea and spirit should be to facilitate high levels
of collaboration, learnings and, where appropriate, harmonization.
Supervisory colleges, formalized oversight bodies, could be useful to the
extent they can be operationalized at any governance level with relevant
actors and a systemwide purview.252 They have been effectively
251. Oversight Board, OVERSIGHT BOARD, https://www.oversightboard.com
[https://perma.cc/4KNK-BQPG] (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).
252. One definition of a supervisory college is that employed by the European
Central Bank, which defines a supervisory college as “a permanent, though flexible,
structure comprised of an international bank’s “home” and “host” supervisors.” What
are Supervisory Colleges?, EUR. CENT. BANK (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.banking
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deployed within the European Union, for example, to enhance
information sharing among national banking supervisors, to share best
banking practices and to build confidence more broadly in the
international financial system.253
In terms of regulatory function, the regulator’s objectives matter.
This does not merely involve public authorities; effective governance
often requires collaboration with the private sector in the determination
and implementation of appropriate regulatory functions.254 Potential
regulatory functions that should be considered include:
 Third party audits of digital finance platform activity and
adherence to relevant standards.
 Dispute resolution facilitated through a range of mechanisms,
such as ombudsmen, national contact points, grievance mechanisms,
and arbitration.255
 Remedies to provide relief (through the establishment of
insurance schemes, escrow funds, trust funds, or other means) for
people who, for example, may have had their data abused.

Many of these functions can be conducted by or in collaboration
with the private sector. For example, consulting firms can conduct
external audits of companies, and private associations, such as the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), can facilitate dispute

supervision.europa.eu/about/ssmexplained/html/supervisory_colleges.en.html
[https://perma.cc/4KNK-BQPG]. However, the term allows for a variety of other
flexible configurations that allow for the oversight of a cross-border entity or activity.
See id. See also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GOOD PRACTICE PRINCIPLES
ON SUPERVISORY COLLEGES 1-2 (2010); Duncan Alford, Supervisory Colleges: The
Global Financial Crisis and Improving International Supervisory Coordination, 24
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 57, 57-58 (2010).
253. See Alford, supra note 252, at 58.
254. See, e.g., Fabrizio Cafaggi & Andrea Renda, Public and Private Regulation
Mapping the Labyrinth 1 (CEPS Working Document No. 370, 2012),
http://aei.pitt.edu/36811/1/ceps_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XD8P-4C6N].
255. See, e.g., STEFAN ZAGELMEYER ET AL., NON-STATE BASED NON-JUDICIAL
GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS (NSBGM): AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS: A REPORT PREPARED
FOR THE OFFICE OF THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2018),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/ARP/ManchesterStudy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MJR9-ALVP].
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resolution processes.256 Existing standards-setting bodies can also be
leveraged. For example, the OECD has the OECD Guidelines.257 While
the Guidelines themselves are not binding on corporations in the
absence of legislation adopting them with direct effect,258 they are an
annex to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises,259 and thus binding upon OECD member
states and participating governments.260 As a result of this binding
nature, the OECD Guidelines provide for the establishment of National
Contact Points (NCPs) in each adhering state to facilitate and promote
adherence to the Guidelines.261 More importantly, though, as a system of
national offices, the NCPs are meant to provide access to remedies for
256. Dispute
Resolution
Services,
INT’L
CHAMBER
OF
COM.,
https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/
[https://perma.cc/4U4K-N3Z]
(last
visited Dec. 10, 2021).
257. The guidelines themselves are a part of the Declaration on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises. See Declaration on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises, June 20, 1976, OECD/LEGAL/0144. This is an
international legal framework established to govern investment activity among the
OECD’s member states and adhering governments. Id. As such, the framework
addresses matters such as national treatment, conflicting requirements, and issues
pertaining to investment incentives and disincentives. Id.
258. For instance, Article 18 of the E.U. Taxonomy Regulation on sustainable
investments requires compliance with the OECD Guidelines as a precondition for
qualifying an investee company as a sustainable investment. See European Parliament
and Council Regulation 2020/852 of 18 June 2020, Establishment of a Framework to
Facilitate Sustainable Investment, and Amending Regulation 2019/2088, 2020 O.J. (L
198) 13-43.
259. Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, supra
note 257.
260. Id.
261. Section I of the Decision of the OECD Council on the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises provides that:

Adhering countries shall set up National Contact Points for
undertaking promotional activities, handling inquiries and for
discussions with the parties concerned on all matters covered by the
Guidelines so that they can contribute to the solution of problems
which may arise in this connection, taking due account of the
attached procedural guidance. The business community, employee
organisations, and other interested parties shall be informed of the
availability of such facilities.
OECD, supra note 243.
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people harmed by corporate noncompliance with the Guidelines. This
role was strongly endorsed by the G7 in June 2015 when the group’s
communiqué stated that the G7 is committed:
[T]o strengthening mechanisms for providing access to remedies
including the [NCPs] for the [Guidelines]. In order to do so, the G7
will encourage the OECD to promote peer reviews and peer learning
on the functioning and performance of NCPs. We will ensure that
our own NCPs are effective and lead by example.262

The NCPs are particularly interesting because of their structure and
role in facilitating more responsible business conduct.263 Although all
NCPs are government offices, they are not all structured the same
way.264 Some are housed in a single agency or ministry, such as the local
ministry of economy or trade.265 Other NCPs are inter-agency bodies,
and even others have tripartite or quadripartite structures involving
business, labor unions, or civil society stakeholders.266 This type of
flexibility and creativity in regulatory structure and performance of
function can be instructive in potential ways to govern the operations of
digital finance platforms.
While the OECD and its NCP mechanism serve as a useful
example of potential regulatory configurations and associated functions,
it is important to highlight the underrepresentation of developing
countries in most international regulatory fora and standard setting
bodies. A study of public consultations on the Basel banking standards,
for example, shows that official and private actors from developing
countries rarely account for more than 20 percent of respondents.267 This
is due to a series of factors such as limited regulatory knowledge and
262.
263.

See LEADERS’ DECLARATION, G7 SUMMIT 5 (2015).
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., NATIONAL CONTACT POINTS FOR
RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT- PROVIDING ACCESS TO REMEDY: 20 YEARS AND THE
ROAD AHEAD 1 (2020), http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/NCPs-for-RBC-providingaccess-to-remedy-20-years-and-the-road-ahead.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9HW-SMSB].
264. What are National Contact Points for Responsible Business Conduct?, OECD,
https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncps/what-are-ncps-for-rbc.htm
[https://perma.cc/4VEC-YQ2N] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022). See also National Contact
Points, OECD WATCH, https://www.oecdwatch.org/oecd-ncps/national-contact-pointsncps/ [https://perma.cc/9GMN-ZDVK] (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See ANDREW WALTER, EMERGING COUNTRIES AND BASEL III: WHY IS
ENGAGEMENT STILL LOW 8 (2015), https://www.cigionline.org/static/documents/
new_thinking_g20_no.4.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJ7E-ARZ2].
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resources in developing countries;268 the focus and agenda-setting of an
elite network of developed country regulators;269 and limited
engagement by developing country private sector actors in the
deliberations and resultant proposals of international standard setting
bodies.270 This should concern regulators and policymakers in both
developing and developed countries. It should worry developing country
regulators because without participating in these fora, they limit their
ability to determine the rules by which international economic actors
must abide when they operate on a transnational basis. When not in the
“regulation-setting room,” developing country regulators are left to fend
for themselves within their own jurisdictions with limited resources in
the face of corporate behemoths.271 Conversely, developed country
regulators should be troubled that developing country regulators are not
participating in their standard setting fora because (a) the noninvolvement of developing country actors in rule and standard setting
will not support compliance in those countries, and (b) rapidly growing,
innovative firms are emerging from these countries which may, in time,
pose risks to financial stability in developed countries or even
globally.272 As such, there needs to be a collective effort to enhance the
skills and capacity of developing country regulators, and to increase
their engagement in standard setting and regulatory processes at all
governance levels.
E. PRINCIPLE FIVE: INSTILLING A COMMITMENT TO SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
To enhance the responsible conduct of digital finance platforms and
better support sustainable development, most notably through attainment
of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
governance frameworks and initiatives should require board-level
commitment of digital finance platforms to incorporate the SDGs into
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Milan Babic et al., States Versus Corporations: Rethinking the Power
of Business in International Politics, 52 INT’L SPECTATOR 20, 27 (2017) (reporting that
twenty-six out of the top fifty largest economies were corporations).
272. See, e.g., Marcello Pericoli & Massimo Sbracia, A Primer on Financial
Contagion, 17 J. ECON. SURV. 571 (2003).
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business plans and models, particularly when operating in developing
countries. This can be facilitated (and sometimes manifested) by greater
multistakeholder coordination and collaboration, and some regulators
may even mandate it.273 As already discussed, regulators carry heavy
burdens, so there needs to be complementary action by the private
sector.274 This action would include their assumption of responsibility
for their impacts and their roles in facilitating sustainable development.
Through a process of education, due diligence, and disclosures, as
discussed above, digital finance platforms can support the attainment of
the SDGs by:
(1) Developing an awareness of digital finance platform impacts on
the SDGs;275
(2) Promoting positive and mitigating negative impacts on attaining
SDGs;276 and
(3) Integrating (1) and (2) into their core business models and
operations.

Board-level engagement is important for two primary reasons.
First, engagement at senior levels enables action by individuals with the
authority to commit resources and drive the agenda.277 Second, board
level engagement communicates to stakeholders that the company takes
the matter seriously.278 In the drive towards sustainable development,

273. See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Multi-Interest Self-Governance Through Global
Product Certification Programs 17 (Buffalo Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 2006016, 2006).
274. See, e.g., Fabrizio Cafaggi & Andrea Renda, Public and Private Regulation
Mapping the Labyrinth 1 (C.E.P.S., Working Paper No. 370, 2012), http://aei.pitt.edu/
36811/1/ceps_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/38BG-272M].
275. For further guidance on these impacts, see the technical papers completed for
the Dialogue on Global Digital Finance Governance. Towards an Inclusive, SDGAligned Governance of BigFintech, UNDP SUSTAINABLE FIN. HUB, https://sdgfinance.
undp.org/digital-finance/towards-inclusive [https://perma.cc/2JF9-MY4T] (last visited
Jan. 17, 2022).
276. Id.
277. See, e.g., Moo Jun Hao & Rashad Yazdanifard, How Effective Leadership can
Facilitate Change in Organizations through Improvement and Innovation, 15 GLOB. J.
MGMT. BUS. RSCH. 1, 1 (2015), https://globaljournals.org/GJMBR_Volume15/1-HowEffective-Leadership.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VU3-7Q2Q].
278. GLOB. CORP. GOVERNANCE F., STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT AND THE BOARD:
INTEGRATING BEST GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 1 (2009).
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concerted and collaborative action by all stakeholders is pivotal.279 This
also applies to relevant regulators that should consider how their policies
might affect the attainment of SDGs.280
It is important to note a fine distinction between this Principle and
Principle Three, “Fostering Responsible Actors.” While the latter may
take on more of a compliance and regulatory flavor, this Principle
speaks more to an opportunity for digital finance platforms and
corporate actors more broadly. The U.N. Guiding Principles and OECD
Guidelines are frameworks which seek to mitigate the potential negative
impacts of corporate activity. They are sets of proscriptions and guard
rails for corporate actors.281 The SDGs, on the other hand, are
aspirational and actionable.282 They are targets set and supported by the
state for the collective betterment of individuals, communities, and the
environment by 2030.283 Achieving those goals requires concerted
effort, entrepreneurialism across the public and private sectors, and
considerable funding.284 As such, while the SDGs seek to drive positive
impacts and outcomes broadly, they also represent opportunities for
corporations. This win-win scenario is worth promoting in devising a
principles-based approach to the governance of digital finance
platforms.
V. BUILDING A BALANCED PROPORTIONAL GRADUATED RISK-BASED
APPROACH TO DIGITAL FINANCE
The emergence of scale, concentration, and dominance in digital
finance platforms poses significant challenges to policymakers and
regulators, firstly from a conceptual standpoint, and secondly from an

279. The Sustainable Development Agenda, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/
sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/ [https://perma.cc/Z9NT-247R] (last
visited Dec. 10, 2021).
280. PEOPLE’S MONEY: HARNESSING DIGITALIZATION TO FINANCE A SUSTAINABLE
FUTURE, supra note 183.
281. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 243; Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, supra note 244.
282. PEOPLE’S MONEY: HARNESSING DIGITALIZATION TO FINANCE A SUSTAINABLE
FUTURE, supra note 183.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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execution standpoint.285 The sprawling cross-border nature of their
business models impacts a multitude of distinct yet related sectors, such
as telecommunications, finance, and data protection, and requires
authorities to consider the question of how to regulate along several axes
and dimensions.286 This is particularly so as digital finance platforms can
be global in scope and have widely differing local impacts.287 As such,
while the principles that we propose in the Section above provide the
foundations upon which regulators and policymakers should seek to
design their governance frameworks, we appreciate the need for much
more concrete guidance. Moreover, guidance will need to be context
specific, as regulators and economies will all have differing resources
and realities. In these final two parts of the Article, we address this by
presenting, first, a toolkit of regulatory approaches and considerations
that authorities could implement and, second, a more specific set of
prescriptions for what a global governance framework for digital finance
platforms could entail.
The first step towards the formulation of an appropriate governance
strategy is for regulators and policymakers to consider a series of
applicable factors that are constituted by axes and categories. These
include:
 Governance level: at what level are regulators looking to
intervene? E.g., national, regional (the European Union), or
international (cross-border, public-private mix of regulatory action).
 Governance actor: which actors do regulators think would be
most capable and appropriate to assume regulatory functions? Are
they within the public or private sector? Should they contemplate
creating new institutions?
 Subject matter: which sector is the regulator looking to focus
on? These can include data privacy, telecommunications, finance,
etc. Further, is the regulator looking to focus on the entity, the
entity’s activity, or a combination of the two?

285. See Carstens et al., supra note 3; Juan Carlos Crisanto et al., Big Techs in
Finance: Regulatory Approaches and Policy Options 1 (Bank for Int’l Settlements
F.S.I. Briefs, Paper No. 12, 2021), https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsibriefs12.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YTZ7-CUU7].
286. Id.
287. Id.
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 The state of local/national FinTech ecosystem development:
how advanced is it? Is it still nascent with a few actors, or are there a
range of actors from start-ups to large firms with significant market
share? How well regulated is the ecosystem? Is there already
adequate and appropriate legislation?
 Regulatory capacity: what levels of expertise and experience
do relevant regulators have? Are they able to comprehend the
complexity of the issues and to develop appropriate approaches to
reach specified public policy objectives? Do they have the
competence to provide effective oversight?
 Political buy-in: to what extent is there sufficient political will
among regulators and policymakers to develop strategies (e.g., a
national strategy or vision would be very helpful in terms of setting
direction and aligning actors), draft legislation, and implement and
execute with sufficient resources?

This kind of preliminary self-assessment by regulators can help
them reflect on the risks and opportunities within their economies.288
Thus, it is imperative to determine how to develop a balanced,
proportional, and graduated risk-based approach to the governance of
digital finance platforms. Such a risk-based approach is desirable as it
allows regulators to tailor their interventions to their local circumstances
in ways that can promote growth and innovation while tempering and
containing specific risks. We anticipate that such an approach will
require concerted and coordinated collaboration among relevant actors
within the ecosystem.
Armed with this preliminary assessment, we now provide a
spectrum of regulatory approaches that authorities can deploy
specifically to govern actors and activities within FinTech 4.0 and the
platformization of finance. Bearing in mind that regulators will all be
starting at different points and operating under different circumstances,
our proposed toolkit of approaches is designed to be used in different
contexts as necessary.289
Regulatory approaches can be seen on a spectrum from permissive
to restrictive, with laissez-faire at one end and prohibition at the other.
288. See ARNER ET AL., INNOVATIVE REGULATORY APPROACHES TOOLKIT 29 (2021),
https://www.afi-global.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/04/AFI_DFSWG_AW_Innovative-Regulatory-Approaches.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2N9C-GBLL].
289. See generally Zetzsche et al., supra note 4, at 275-76.
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In between lies a range of techniques: active encouragement such as
industrial policy, infrastructure development or innovation hubs; testand-learn approaches, such as piloting or sandboxes; self-regulation;
minimal registration or licensing; disclosure; co-regulation; internal
governance requirements; external monitoring via penalties and
enforcement; graduated proportional regulation; public utility
regulation; and structural reform, such as unbundling or nationalization.
These approaches can apply in the context of market failures, public
goods, and externalities across the range of policy considerations raised
by digital finance platforms, including financial sector policy,
competition and antitrust policy, communications and technology
policy, data protection policy, and sustainable development policy. With
the entry of BigTech into finance, the rise of Big FinTechs and
TechFins, and the emergence of platformization of finance as the central
characteristics of FinTech 4.0, approaches to dominance and
concentration in digital finance – based on the principles advanced in
the previous Section and involving the major regulatory regimes
considered in Part II – are now becoming clear.
A. PERMISSIVE AND FACILITATIVE APPROACHES: LAISSEZ-FAIRE,
ENCOURAGEMENT, AND TEST-AND-LEARN
The first possible approach to digital finance platforms would
simply be not to regulate them. By doing nothing, the result would be
either rigorous or laissez-faire depending upon whether current financial
regulation applies to the operations of a particular platform.290 Doing
nothing might involve requiring new entrants to comply with existing
financial regulation, often with highly restrictive results and adverse
effects on financial innovation.
Alternately, a do-nothing approach could simultaneously accelerate
financial innovation and exacerbate data-driven market dynamics.291
China, especially before 2015, is often highlighted as a leading and
highly successful example of the permissive approach to FinTech.292
290. Dirk Zetzsche et al., Digital Finance Platforms: Towards a New Regulatory
Paradigm, 23 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 273, 325 (2020).
291. Id.
292. See Weihuan Zhou et al., Regulation of Digital Financial Services in China:
Last Mover Advantage?, 8 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 25, 27-28 (2015) (arguing that the
Chinese regulations of digital financial services before 2015 lack detailed and
comprehensive provision) [hereinafter Zhou et al., Regulation of Digital Financial
Services in China]; Arner et al., supra note 4, at 1298-99 (arguing that due to the
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Most notably, during its unregulated period, Alibaba laid the foundation
for the world’s largest financial ecosystem (measured by number of
clients). While the soundness of the Chinese financial system prior to
the FinTech boom may explain the benefits of doing nothing for
innovation and development in this particular case,293 and while nonlegal means allowed political control over the emerging providers of
financial ecosystems, the Chinese example also demonstrates the
systemic risks that can arise from unexpected and uninhibited growth of
certain market participants.294 That growth has given way, since 2015, to
a much more cautious regulatory approach.295
In the context of digital finance platforms, however, a laissez-faire
approach would be likely to further the growth of existing platforms.296
Although this is the approach most countries have taken so far, it has the
potential to result in undesirable winner-take-all outcomes.297 Going
forward, policymakers and regulators need to provide supporting
frameworks to maximize the benefits of data aggregation and use in
finance and platformization of finance. At the same time, they need to
monitor its evolution and build proportional regulatory approaches to
both support positive aspects and minimize emerging risks, particularly
from scale and dominance.
adoption of a largely commercialized financial system, there is a rapid growth of P2P
lending platforms in China since 2009); Weihuan Zhou et al., China’s Regulation of
Digital Financial Services: Some Recent Developments, 90 AUSTL. L.J. 297, 300 (2016)
(arguing that the regulatory work has progressed slowly to enable the rapid growth of
digital financial service in China).
293. See Christian Haddad & Lars Hornuf, The Emergence of the Global FinTech
Market: Economic and Technical Determinants 18 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 6131,
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2830124 [https://perma.cc/C6DN-4AX5] (arguing that
the soundness of the financial system has a negative effect on FinTech start-up
dynamics; i.e. financial systems with many deficits provide a vibrant environment for
start-ups).
294. See e.g., Eric Levitz, China’s Sweeping Crackdown on Big Tech Is a Wake-Up
Call for the U.S., N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 6, 2021), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/
2021/08/chinas-sweeping-crackdown-on-big-tech-is-a-wake-up-call.html
[https://perma.cc/6FA6-BNPR]; Megha Bahree, What’s behind China’s Big Tech
crackdown and what does it mean?, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.
aljazeera.com/economy/2020/11/13/china-is-clamping-down-on-its-tech-companiesheres-what-we-know [https://perma.cc/3JWP-SH8R].
295. See Zhou et al., Regulation of Digital Financial Services in China, supra note
292, at 27.
296. See Feyen et al., supra note 15.
297. Id.
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Beyond simply a permissive approach, governments around the
world are increasingly considering ways in which to directly support
innovation, typically through early-stage research and development
investment.298 In addition, in recognizing the importance of data to
future innovation, development, and competitiveness, regulators and
policymakers are considering ways in which to support the role of data
in sustainable development.299 The most advanced of these relate to
“open banking,” “open finance,” and “open data,” with the European
Union, United Kingdom, and, particularly, Australia having the most
developed approaches so far.300 Others–such as China–are considering
ways to maximize the benefits of data for future innovation and
development by, for instance, recognizing data as a public good or
commons which can then be used across society.301 Similar discussions
are taking place in the technological context, particularly in discussions
of the potential role of decentralization and blockchain.302 In the specific
context of FinTech innovation, test-and-learn approaches – including
piloting, regulatory sandboxes, and special charters and licenses303–have
298. OECD, OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION OUTLOOK 2021:
TIMES OF CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY CRISIS (2021).
299. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., TECHNOLOGY &
INNOVATION REPORT 2021: TASK FORCE ON DIGITAL FINANCING OF THE SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT GOALS, PEOPLE’S MONEY: HARNESSING DIGITALIZATION TO FINANCE A
SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (2020), https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/df_task_force
_-_full_report_-_aug_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8Q3-LPUA] [hereinafter T ASK
FORCE ON DIGITAL FINANCING OF THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS].
300. Douglas Arner et al., Open Banking, Open Data and Open Finance: Lessons
from the European Union 38 (UNSW Law, Research Paper No. 21-69, 2021).
301. See, e.g., U.K. NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COMMISSION, DATA FOR THE
PUBLIC GOOD 8, https://nic.org.uk/app/uploads/Data-for-the-Public-Good-NICReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU6L-QVLD]. See also WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM,
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM LAUNCHES INITIATIVE TO ENABLE EQUITABLE AND TRUSTED
USE OF DATA FOR GLOBAL COMMON GOOD (2020), https://www.weforum.org/
press/2020/12/world-economic-forum-launches-initiative-to-enable-equitable-andtrusted-use-of-data-for-global-common-good/ [https://perma.cc/BC88-JZAG].
302. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM, THE FUTURE IS DECENTRALISED 7 (2018),
https://www.undp.org/publications/future-decentralised
[https://perma.cc/RH7F-AV
MR].
303. A regulatory sandbox is a safe space in which innovative FinTech applications
can be tested with sharply reduced regulatory requirements (subject to certain preconditions). An innovation hub is a portal that facilitates access of industry to regulators
and seeks to promote bespoke regulation, no-action letters, and other dispensations on a
case-by-case basis. Special charters are authorizations to conduct FinTech type
businesses without having to comply with the full panoply of financial regulation,
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been discussed as methods to support balanced innovation.304 As
discussed in Principle Two (developing reflexive and iterative
regulation),305 these tools, while far from being a panacea, do enhance
the flow of information between innovative firms and their regulators.
Some may argue that in the face of BigTechs or digital finance
platforms, these tools may prove of little value since they are designed
to promote testing of new technologies and business models rather than
to regulate global players. However, the countervailing argument is that
such initiatives promote the creation of new financial services by
smaller players, which could have disproportionately large impacts in
advancing particular SDGs in developing countries.306 Moreover, digital
finance platforms will most likely continue to innovate and provide new
offerings that would ideally be tested within sandboxes to minimize
potential negative impacts.

though subject to special limits. See generally Buckley et al., supra note 222, at 56-61
(introducing regulatory sandboxes and innovation hubs in fintech regulations).
304. See Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 580
(2019) (“Regulatory sandboxes offer an environment in which fintech entrepreneurs
can conduct limited tests of their innovations with fewer regulatory constraints, real
customers, less risk of enforcement action, and ongoing guidance from regulators.”).
See also Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 1047-49 (2015) (arguing that innovation hubs provide
businesses with individual guidance and additional support in order to help developers
understand the regulatory framework); Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, FinTech and
the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235, 283-85 (2019) (offering a general
introduction of innovative regulatory strategies to navigate the policy trilemma in
regulating fintech); Kathryn Judge, Investor-Driven Financial Innovation, 8 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 291, 335–38 (2018) (providing an overview of the different innovative
regulations in FinTech); Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: FinTech as a
Systemic Phenomenon, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 735, 756-59 (2019) (introducing how
fintech has eroded the New Deal settlement and the need for a novel conceptual
framework). See generally William Magnuson, Regulating FinTech, 71 VANDER. L.
REV. 1168 (2018) (calling for a wide-ranging reconceptualization of financial
regulation in fintech); Zetzsche et al., supra note 4 (discussing new regulatory
approaches in fintech).
305. See supra Section IV.B.
306. Sharmista Appaya & Mahjabeen Haji, Four Years and Counting: What We’ve
Learned from Regulatory Sandboxes, WORLD BANK BLOGS, (Nov. 18, 2020),
https://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/four-years-and-counting-what-weve-learnedregulatory-sandboxes [https://perma.cc/N3FZ-ZZS5].
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B. FOUNDATIONAL REGULATION: DATA APPROACHES
A second regulatory approach focuses on enhancing competition to
ensure that competitive market forces play a beneficial role rather than
contribute to an already concentrated financial sector. Pro-competition
measures have been considered in regard to IT and software,307 critical
financial market infrastructure such as payment, clearing, and settlement
systems,308 and in “open banking” initiatives.309 This Section will review
some of the pro-competition strategies that regulators can choose in their
pursuit of digital finance platform governance.
Regulation should aim at securing objective, transparent, and fair
risk-based, rather than profit-based, conditions of access. Open
interfaces, open-source code of the technology core, fair and nondiscriminatory access requirements, and a transparent fee structure
enable third-party developers to write proprietary applications for
platform clients.310 Principle 18 of the IOSCO principles on access to the
services of critical infrastructure providers is relevant here:
An FMI’s participation requirements should be justified in terms of
the safety and efficiency of the FMI and the markets it serves, be
tailored to and commensurate with the FMI’s specific risks, and be
publicly disclosed. Subject to maintaining acceptable risk control

307. See, e.g., LUCA RUBINI, MICROSOFT ON TRIAL: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF A TRANSATLANTIC ANTITRUST CASE 39-43 (Luca Rubini ed. 2010)
(introducing the pro-competition measures used to regulate dominant technology
players like Microsoft).
308. See COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 101 (2012) (discussing access
conditions by providers of Financial Market Infrastructure).
309. See Markos Zachariadis & Pinar Ozcan, The API Economy and Digital
Transformation in Financial Services: The Case of Open Banking 10-12 (SWIFT Inst.,
Working Paper No. 2016-001, 2017) (discussing the challenges and opportunities that
open application programming interfaces bring to the open banking sector),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2975199 [https://perma.cc/PMS5-KHLD].
310. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F.Supp. 2d 144, 191 (D.D.C. 2002)
(settling the year-long U.S. Department of Justice’s antitrust litigation against Microsoft
on abusive terms for third-party web browser software and requiring Microsoft to make
available for use by third parties on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms certain
technology used by Microsoft server operating system products to interoperate with
Windows operating system products).
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standards, an FMI should endeavor to set requirements that have the
least-restrictive impact on access that circumstances permit. 311

One special feature that would enable competition while retaining
the benefits of digital finance platforms is an open data requirement for
dominant firms that would allow innovative competitors to offer
services that make use of existing data pools rather than building new
ones at a great expense.
Regulators should mandate that digital finance platforms and other
incumbents grant new entrants access to client account data; this would
result in a reduction of client switching costs because the newcomer
could ensure a smooth tech migration. While standardization of client
data is a crucial precondition for smooth migration,312 doubts remain
about whether in fact small, innovative, new entrants would benefit from
such a rule.313 For example, some evidence from the European Union’s
Open Banking Initiative suggests that access to client data appears to
facilitate the market access of large technology companies that have
resources to (1) attract a sufficient number of new clients and (2)
program large scale data transfer interfaces.314
Thus, we propose requiring open client data from firms with a
strong, potentially dominant position, regardless of their sector of origin.
In an effort to hamper any further concentration of financial service
providers, an open data requirement, paired with a data governance
requirement that enables data administration on a standardized basis,
could be attached once the market share exceeds, for example, 5 percent
in any given financial market. This would break into the data-based
economies of scale and allow easier entry for smaller competitors.
Regulators should also ask potential users of digital finance
platforms to diversify their own risks deriving from their dependency on
311.
312.

BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 308.
See Giuseppe Colangelo & Oscar Borgogno, Data, Innovation and
Transatlantic Competition in Finance: The Case of the Access to Account Rule 22
(Transatlantic Tech. L.F., European Union Law Working Paper, No. 35, 2018)
(observing that a European Union-wide FinTech market requires standardization to
simplify data transmission and facilitate competition and interoperability),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3251584 [https://perma.cc/H9QWG4NN].
313. See Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., The Evolution and Future of Data-Driven Finance
in the EU, 57 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 331, 342-46 (2020) (analyzing the facilitation of
open banking in the European Union to enhance competition in banking and payments).
314. Id.
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a certain platform. For example, a regulation could require that any
financial firm must employ at least two or more unrelated providers or
systems. While mandatory diversification has some positive effects on
market structure, it also comes with increased costs, imposed
redundancy, additional cybersecurity risks (given that multiple systems
would have access to the consumer data), and reduced benefits of
datafication (because of slowed IT processes). Most importantly,
mandated diversification could reduce platform-specific benefits for
users by moving away from one look and feel and one quality and level
of service, as well as the accumulation and best use of a client’s liquidity
for ensuring lower costs on the back end. Mandatory diversification, if
imposed, might work only on the back end. Further, mandatory
diversification may not be applicable to developing economies that lack
a sufficient number of service providers for diversification. An
alternative to this mandatory diversification suggestion might be
limiting a platform’s maximum share of clients in a given market.
In markets where there are more than one significant digital finance
platform or other platform service, users under this proposal would be
required to switch providers every few years. Rotation would likely be
costly: all weblinks, data interfaces, and, in some cases, brokerage
connections, would need readjustment after each change, giving the
institution’s clients even more reason to contract directly with the
platform provider. Providers will also find it difficult to negotiate fee
reductions based on revenues earned if the law mandates regular
displacements of the very revenue for which the discount provides an
incentive to stay. Further, if the technology of their consumers is linked
– either technically or economically – to the platform, an institution’s
users will have even more reason to contract directly with the platform,
thereby exacerbating, rather than slowing, market concentration.
Finally, merger control is the standard competition approach to
overly concentrated markets.315 Though antitrust law’s main rationale is
market efficiency, our analysis of digital finance platforms suggests that
merger control can also be justified from a financial regulation
perspective: mergers of very large platforms could be prohibited not
only because of competition concerns, but also for client protection,
innovation and, especially, financial stability concerns.

315. INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN MERGER GUIDELINES WORKBOOK 6
(2006), https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/
MWG_MergerGuidelinesWorkbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/MU76-3BHE].

60

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

C. DESIGNATION AS A REGULATED INDUSTRY
Regulators have at their disposal moderate regulatory interventions
such as various types of command-and-control, self-regulatory, and coregulatory approaches. The most effective approach will depend on the
platform’s stage of evolution. As a general matter, the greater the scale
and/or significance of a digital finance platform, the stronger the case
for an intervention.316
1. Command-and-Control Regulation
A standard response of regulators to increasing concentration
within a given industry is adding an additional layer of regulation upon
the firms, particularly through requiring licensing for regulated
activities. In doing so, they enhance control over the sector and obtain
better data for regulatory decisions. The difficulty in submitting digital
finance platforms to regulation is finding a common denominator of
activities that accurately describes the range of activities involved in a
platform.317
Given that the core of platform activity is data collection and
processing, regulators could define “financial data gathering and
analytics” as a regulated activity and exempt participants that do not
meet certain size or scope requirements. The result of such regulation
could be a differentiated regime with tiered rules for large platforms,
similar to the rules applicable to SIFIs, moderate reporting requirements
for mid-size platforms, and a mere registration requirement for small
ones.318 Such a regime would probably have to state expressly that it
does not apply to regulated banks and financial institutions or otherwise
it would so apply, given the extent of data gathering and analysis in a
modern bank and the undesirability of regulatory overlaps.
A different regulatory approach could focus on the underlying
code, i.e., its technical functionality. Supervisory agencies could seek to
understand the technology and require additional code aimed at
meaningfully balancing private incentives with public interests. For
316. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 308, at 12-13 (discussing
applicability and proportionality of the FMI principles).
317. See Feyen et al., supra note 15.
318. See e.g., SCO40 – Global Systemically Important Banks, Basel Framework,
BIS, https://www.bis.org/basel_framework/chapter/SCO/40.htm?inforce=20211109&
published=20211109 [https://perma.cc/9U5Q-L2V2] (last updated Nov. 9, 2021).
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example, regulators can choose to monitor credit risk assessment
software for hidden gender, race, or other biases and require companies
to amend the underlying code if such biases are detected. Such a codefocused approach would ask much from regulators trained in financial
and legal matters but will almost certainly be necessary.319
2. Self-Regulation
Self-regulation is a critical means of drawing upon the knowledge
of participants when regulators reach the limits of their own expertise.
Thus, FMI providers typically establish a common set of rules and
procedures for all participants, including a technical infrastructure and a
specialized, customized risk management framework.320 While these
rules and procedures often take a contractual form,321 a self-regulatory
approach could formalize the adoption and amendment of these rules
and establish a minimum publication and notice period. Regulators
could use these frameworks to enhance control over platforms.
The downside of self-regulation is the dependency of the selfregulated constituency on adopting rules.322 Where the collective private
and public interests collide, we might expect few serious efforts at selfregulation. In particular, although we might see the establishment of
basic investor protections, the provider and its participants have little
interest in slowing growth by curtailing the network effects from which
they benefit, and so will do little to combat antitrust concerns and sizebased systemic risk. Self-regulatory organizations thus face the tension
between remaining light-touch and interest-friendly or turning into more
of a public oversight body focused on technicalities in addition to

319. We have considered the issues of how regulators can address cyber risks
elsewhere. See Ross P. Buckley et al., TechRisk, SING. J. LEGAL STU. 35, 43-44 (2020)
(offering ways to address the emerging security risks that result from technical
innovation and digitization of finance).
320. See COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 7 (2012), https://www.bis.org/
cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf [https://perma.cc/EP3Z-683M] (defining FMIs, their function, and
the range of their features).
321. Id.
322. JAN SAMMECK, A NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE ON INDUSTRY
SELF-REGULATION 60 (2012).
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mandatory regulation, like the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA).323
3. Co-Regulation
Regulators could also pursue a co-regulation strategy. Coregulation has been defined as a:
[M]echanism whereby [a] legislative act entrusts the attainment of
the objectives defined by the legislative authority to parties which
are recognized in the field (such as economic operators, the social
partners, non-governmental organizations, or associations) by setting
objectives to be attained but their achievement is entrusted to nonpublic actors in economic and social domains.324

Co-regulation has been discussed as potentially effective for nonfinancial platform industries; its inclusion of a broad pool of innovators
“in the articulation, execution and evolution of policy, law, norms
development, oversight and regulation,”325 elicits more balanced views.
An example is when local authorities and Airbnb agreed on the
collection of tourist tax.326
For digital finance platforms, regulators could seek to enter into coregulation agreements with operators that reflect public concerns such as
systemic risk, customer protection, market integrity, and national
security. As with any other regulatory tool, however, co-regulation has
its limits when the public interest collides with the provider’s profitseeking behavior. Thus, although co-regulation could be a way to
implement moderate investor protection and national security measures,
it may be less effective than some of the other strategies suggested in

323. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch,
99 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12–15 (2013) (analyzing the evolution of FINRA from a selfregulatory organization to a quasi-governmental organization).
324. See Michèle Finck, Digital Co-Regulation: Designing a Supranational Legal
Framework for the Platform Economy 15-16 (London Soc’y Econ., Society and
Economy Working Paper No. 15/2017, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2990043
[https://perma.cc/2A6J-G4K6] (defining co-regulation).
325. See Raymond H. Brescia, Regulating the Sharing Economy: New and Old
Insights into an Oversight Regime for the Peer-to-Peer Economy, 95 NEB. L. REV. 87,
134 (2016) (recognizing the benefits of decentralized policymaking and regulatory
pluralism).
326. See Finck, supra note 324, at 16-18 (list of examples).
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combating the competition and financial stability concerns outlined
above.327
D. PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
In line with scholarship on platform industries,328 digital finance
platforms could be regulated as public utilities. Regulation
characteristics of public utilities include, for instance, rate regulation,
minimum service level and quality assurance prescriptions, and a
defined or capped rate of return on investments. This list demonstrates
that traditional public utility regulation fits best for highly standardized
services such as energy and water supply. Regulators seeking to set the
aforementioned limits in a highly innovative, rapidly growing
environment such as digital financial services will face potentially
insurmountable challenges.
A less intrusive form of public utility status is the designation of
certain systems as Financial Market Utilities which require advanced
risk-management methods, intensified supervision, and advance notice
of rule changes.329 The Financial Market Utilities rules were drafted for
clearing organizations and central counterparties and would need
amendments to reflect, among other things, the data and liquidity
dimension of digital finance platforms.330 This is the approach being
taken in China in the context of Ant and other digital finance platforms:
designating them as SIFIs and subjecting them to higher regulatory and
supervisory attention.331
327.
328.

See, supra Sections V.A.–C.2.
See K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social
Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV.
1621, 1634-35 (2018) (arguing that public utility concepts offer a framework for
understanding and contesting private power in a variety of sectors, including the
financial and platform markets). See also K. Sabeel Rahman, Regulating Informational
Infrastructure: Internet Platforms as the New Public Utilities, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV.
234, 240–42 (2018) (detailing how the utility concept applies to internet platforms).
329. See Designated Financial Market Utilities: Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act,
FED. RSRV., https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/title-viii-dfa.htm [https://
perma.cc/6YHU-GDA5] (last updated Jan. 29, 2015).
330. Id.
331. See, e.g., Xinmei Shen, China Amends Anti-Monopoly Law for the First Time
Amid Tech Crackdown, Increasing Penalties and Regulatory Control, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST (Oct. 27, 2021, 7:00 PM), https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/
article/3153881/china-amends-anti-monopoly-law-first-time-amid-tech-crackdown
[https://perma.cc/GHZ5-9FAS].
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As a form of indirect regulation, supervisory authorities could
become significant shareholders or operators of a digital finance
platform. One example is real-time gross settlement (RTGS) payment
systems in which the technology core is developed with the involvement
of central banks that, in some cases, also engage in operations.332 Similar
approaches are now being seen in an increasing number of jurisdictions
at the retail level with “fast payment systems.”333 Putting aside the
obvious capacity constraints of many competent authorities, having a
stake in a digital finance platform brings potential informational
advantages for a central bank or other regulatory agency.334
On the downside, authority stakes in a platform create a potentially
undesirable outcome. The platform in which a central bank or other
authority might take a stake is likely to be a monopolist that will
plausibly leave little room for additional market-led innovation.
Governmental investment makes the most sense in markets where
competition is unlikely to develop in the first place, such as where
existing financial institutions are insufficiently funded, tech expertise is
scarce,335 or competition is undesirable because all financial institutions
must meet the same standard to reduce their customers’ transaction costs
(such as in payment systems).
E. UNBUNDLING
A more interventionist approach would mandate unbundling.
Unbundling is well established as a competition measure, yet financial

332. See, e.g., Morten Linnemann Bech et al., The Quest for Speed in Payments, BIS
Quarterly Review, BIS (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1703g.htm
[https://perma.cc/8WR2-33T7].
333. Anton Didenko et al., After Libra, the Digital Yuan and Covid-19: Central
Bank-Linked Cryptocurrencies 1, 9-10 (EBI Working Paper Series, Paper No.
2020/036, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3622311 [https://
perma.cc/5X5B-3HBR].
334. Id.
335. These preconditions are often met in developing and emerging economies. This
explains why India’s central bank has developed and operates core infrastructure for
financial services through public-private partnerships, such as the National Payments
Corporation of India. See About Us, NPCI, https://www.npci.org.in/who-we-are/aboutus [https://perma.cc/2X2P-QTVH] (describing NPCI as a not-for-profit umbrella
organization for all retail payments in India).
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law also frequently imposes it.336 Indeed, some contend that a “core
principle” of banking law is the “separation of banking and
commerce.”337 At least in the United States, firms that own or control a
U.S. bank are prohibited from engaging in business activities other than
banking or managing banks.338
Another regulatory strategy would be to mandate separate service
pricing and require an option for consumers to source distinct and
separate services from different digital finance platforms. Unbundling
seeks to separate fees for different services previously sold as a package
and prohibit hidden bundling rebates (“tying”). Unbundling aims at two
different goals. First, it elucidates the price of a single service, allowing
new entrants to review whether they can compete by offering a better
single service, if they cannot compete with the whole platform. 339
Second, unbundling prohibits the cross-subsidization of some services
from the proceeds of other services for which there may be more
competition.340
Unbundling as a regulatory requirement, however, must be handled
with care. Unbundling reduces some efficiencies that stem from bundled
consumer contacts and the better data inherent in handling services
simultaneously.341 After all, unbundling involves ripping the integrated
336. Dan Awrey, Unbundling Banking, Money, and Payments (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 565/2021, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3776739 [https://perma.cc/RJN4-5R3C].
337. See Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce,
and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268, 274–75 (2013) (outlining the policy
rationale for separating banking from certain commercial activities). See also Lina M.
Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 794-95 (2017); Bernard Shull,
Banking and Commerce in the United States, 18 J. BANKING & FIN. 255, 267-68 (1994),
reprinted in Bernard Shull, Banking and Commerce in the United States, 27 J. REPRINTS
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 359, 371 (1997) (reviewing the historical relationship between
banking and commerce and the policies underlying their separation).
338. See Khan, supra note 337, at 794 (stressing the similarity of these rules with
antitrust and competition policy objectives and finding the main justifications for
preserving the separation between banking and commerce include “the needs to
preserve the safety and soundness of insured depository institutions, to ensure a fair and
efficient flow of credit to productive [businesses], and to prevent excessive
concentration of financial and economic power in the financial sector” (brackets in
original).
339. Awrey, supra note 336.
340. Id.
341. There is a wide body of antitrust literature discussing tying practices and
unbundling requirements. See Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and
Policy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469, 470 (2001) (reviewing
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platform apart when, oftentimes, its integration is one of its main
benefits. Regulators imposing unbundling requirements face the further
difficulty of determining which part of a service may be untied at what
point in time without impeding innovation based upon
disintermediation. The more interventionist variant of unbundling, in
which the offering of some services together with others would be
prohibited, is a stronger alternative.
Applying this concept to digital finance platforms, regulators may
wish to adopt unbundling rules that limit the financial or other services
that digital finance platforms can provide. For example, digital finance
platforms that provide IT infrastructure services to financial institutions
may be prohibited from branching out into financial services themselves
to avoid conflicts of interest or market concentration. This would
prevent major cloud service providers, such as Amazon, from also
providing financial services.
A softer form of unbundling and separation would require
segregation. For instance, regulations may prohibit an investment
advisor from booking mutual fund assets in its own accounts and require
the advisor to hold such assets in an account earmarked for the
investors. This softer form would merely manage conflicts: two
functions could be provided by one entity, but an information barrier
would have to be erected and conflicts monitored and managed.
Along these lines, regulation could require the unbundling and
separation of functions not only legally – as the law currently does by
requiring separate legal entities to perform these tasks – but also
technically. A technical unbundling requirement would prohibit a
platform from simultaneously providing fund manager, custodian, and
investor functions, or offering insurance and banking functions, or using
data and liquidity access to secure control over the whole fund value
chain.

post-Chicago tying law and theory and analyzing tying doctrine using decision theory);
Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in
Europe and in the United States in the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, 76 ANTITRUST
L.J. 483, 486 (2009) (analyzing the bundling approaches of Europe and the United
States and advocating a unified test for bundling and tying).

2022]

GOVERNING FINTECH 4.0

67

F. PROHIBITION
Given that digital finance platforms can provide both crucial
infrastructure for financial markets and enormous benefits for
sustainable development, prohibition is unlikely to be an appropriate
option in most cases.342 With that said, many jurisdictions have sought to
prevent or limit the entry of foreign digital finance platforms.343
Nonetheless, while various regulatory approaches may be valid,
generally, prohibition will not be in the interests of sustainable
development.
VI. GOVERNING FINTECH 4.0
The rapid emergence of concentration and dominance in digital
finance via platformization and the dawn of FinTech 4.0 have taken
many by surprise.344 This is particularly so in relation to their impacts on
achieving sustainable development.345 There is a general recognition of
the many advantages that the evolution of digital finance platforms can
bring, particularly as the world grapples with the COVID-19 pandemic
and related acceleration of the digitalization of everything.346 Existing
development agendas and initiatives, such as the U.N. SDGs, the Addis
Ababa Action Agenda, and the Bali FinTech Agenda, acknowledge the
importance of sustainable development and the role that FinTech can
play in achieving it.347 However, there has not yet been a broader and
more systematic consideration of the associated impacts that FinTech,
342. See Zetzsche et al., The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, It’s a Bubble, It’s a Super
Challenge for Regulators, 60 HARV. INT’L L.J. 267, 305-06 (2019) (discussing
prohibition as one policy choice regarding initial coin offerings).
343. See Ehrentraud et al., supra note 83.
344. See Feyen et al., supra note 15; EUR. BANKING AUTH., REPORT ON THE USE OF
DIGITAL PLATFORMS IN THE EU BANKING AND PAYMENTS SECTOR 15 (2021).
345. PEOPLE’S MONEY: HARNESSING DIGITALIZATION TO FINANCE A SUSTAINABLE
FUTURE, supra note 183.
346. See, e.g., ITAI AGUR ET AL., DIGITAL FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE PANDEMIC:
OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS FOR EMERGING AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 1 (2020).
347. UNITED NATIONS, ADDIS ABABA ACTION AGENDA OF THE THIRD
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT 19 (2015),
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2051AAAA_Outcome.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2KL5-CDB8]; IMF, THE BALI FINTECH AGENDA: A BLUEPRINT FOR
SUCCESSFULLY HARNESSING FINTECH’S OPPORTUNITIES (2018), https://www.
elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/007/2018/050/article-A003-en.xml
[https://perma.cc/8DYX-BQFE].
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and digital finance platforms more specifically, can have on social,
economic, and political domains. There has also not been a strategy
developed on how those impacts can either be enhanced if positive or
mitigated and avoided if negative. This Article fills these gaps by
providing an overview of the pertinent issues that regulators and
policymakers should consider for digital finance platform governance.
More specifically, we have argued for a principles-based approach to the
development of appropriate governance frameworks and presented a
range of regulatory techniques that can be deployed.
In the balance of this conclusion, we propose a series of broad and
more specific recommendations for potential regulatory pathways
moving forward. Broadly, regulators will have to tailor their policies to
their specific spheres of influence and regulatory capacities. Some
jurisdictions may benefit from rapid financial and technological
innovation where a laissez-faire strategy combined with test-and-learn
may be most appropriate. Other jurisdictions with more developed
financial and technology markets might find more moderate approaches
with compulsory licensing and publicly mediated self-regulation to be
the right fit.348 Regardless of the context, the central strategy needs to
follow a balanced proportional risk-based approach, covering major
functional activities but bringing in entity-based approaches as the risks
of individual firms increase with size and scale. In this context, this
Article’s Principles One and Two are important as they highlight the
need for foundational financial regulation and reflexive and contextsensitive regulatory policies.
We further suggest that governance should be developed at all
applicable levels–national, regional, and international–and guided from
the international level. The development of an international regulatory
standard would outline the general principles of digital finance platform
governance. Such a framework could initially be developed by the FSB,
IMF, World Bank, BIS, or OECD. It would include appropriate
principles and standards for regulators to implement domestically. The
specific ways to execute the international standards could then be
developed nationally and regionally, and involve the development of
more specific requirements regarding digital finance platforms’ conduct.
Such a framework would be significantly strengthened in effect and
legitimacy if it were produced in a collaborative and coordinated fashion
with a broad multistakeholder constituency from both the Global North
348.

See generally BUCKLEY & ARNER, supra note 7.
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and South. Such a general international framework would help alleviate
problems of regulatory fragmentation and extraterritoriality by
providing general regulatory policy directions while leaving leeway for
national and regional regulators to tailor their approaches to national and
regional needs.
Going further, in choosing an appropriate regulatory strategy,
financial, data, and competition regulators should attempt to balance
their mandates with aspirations of sustainable development. Different
approaches to regulation can directly impact sustainable development by
contributing to, among other things, financial inclusion, labor
development, infrastructure development, and economic growth more
broadly.349 In this context, regulators should take into account how their
decisions affect broader economic and social indicators, and implement
regulatory policies that facilitate or, at the very least, do not harm
society and the environment. This is particularly relevant in the context
of reflexive regulation since some regulatory strategies can lead to
different results in different jurisdictions.
More specifically, we recommend, first, that international financial
supervisory organizations consider forming a joint standing committee
or working group whose principal focus is to galvanize and coordinate
action towards the realization of the Bali FinTech Agenda.350 The 12
policy elements of this Agenda form a broad umbrella which captures
many of the financial inclusion and developmental issues discussed
herein.351 The Agenda is an existing and underutilized policy and
regulatory basis through which global coordination can be effected. The
standing committee or working group could be truly beneficial by:
 Having diverse and appropriate membership, drawing on
expertise and participation from relevant sectors and geographies in
the Global North and South, and including both public and private
sector entities and international, regional, and national bodies.

349. See, e.g., Jayoung James Goo & Joo-Yuen Heo, Between The Impact of the
Regulatory Sandbox on the Fintech Industry, with a Discussion on the Relation
Regulatory Sandboxes and Open Innovation, 6 J. OPEN INNOVATION: TECH., MKT., &
COMPLEXITY 43, 57-58 (2020); Leo Van Hove & Antoine Dubus, M-PESA and
Financial Inclusion in Kenya: Of Paying Comes Saving?, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 568, 569
(2019).
350. IMF, supra note 347.
351. Id.
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 Issuing authoritative (non-binding) regulatory guidance and
training curricula, and serving as a repository of relevant and useful
resources.
 Becoming the focal point for regular meetings and fora for
topical discussion and technical exchange.

Second, national governments should consider the establishment of
interagency teams and units that can work congruently on issues that
relate directly to digital finance platform governance. These could, for
example, incorporate representatives from the ministries of finance,
justice, competition, privacy, and international affairs, among others,
and coordinate relevant policy and regulation that address the full gamut
of digital finance platform activity within their jurisdictions. Further,
these teams could become the national focal point through which
interjurisdictional engagement is facilitated. For example, these could be
the units which engage with the international Bali FinTech Agenda
standing committee or working group. As such, there would be clear and
effective channels through which both global and local action could be
taken in the rapidly developing space of digital platforms.
Regional organizations and national governments should support
industry adoption of responsible business frameworks, such as the U.N.
Global Compact and the Paris Agreement Climate Targets,352 and seek
stronger public-private collaboration for their implementation. National
governments should also consider requiring adherence to these
frameworks as conditions of granting digital finance platform licenses to
operate within their jurisdiction. After all, the U.N. Guiding Principles,
for example, were unanimously endorsed by the U.N. Human Rights
Council when first introduced in 2011.353 This will support
implementation of Principles Three (fostering responsible actors) and
Five (instilling a commitment to sustainable development).
Lastly, the complexity and challenges of digital finance platform
governance mean that this is an area where developing countries may
well need assistance. Many such countries may lack the capacity to
effectively monitor digital finance platforms domestically or enforce
352. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 12, 2015, 2016 WL 9281227, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
353. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/65/310 (Mar. 21, 2011).
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international and transnational regulations. As Principles Three and Four
highlight, cooperation among regulators will be important to avoid
“regulatory arbitrage” and to achieve effective and consistent regulation
of digital finance platforms.

